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
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## PEACE IN THE SUB-CONTINENT

COLONEL R. RAMA RAO (RETD)

**M**ANY in this country had hoped that with the emergence of an independent Bangla Desh the people of the sub-continent would find it possible to re-order their affairs, relatively free from foreign interference. Freed from interested external manipulations, the people of all countries of the sub-continent could have attended to the urgent tasks of economic development in their own ways and according to their own genius.

These hopes, unhappily, have been belied because of the actions of the ruling elite of Pakistan. Mr. Bhutto, having been called upon to put his country on its feet after the 1971 debacle, had an excellent opportunity of writing a new page in the history of his own country and that of the sub-continent. Pakistan's armed forces had been thoroughly discredited. The civilian bureaucracy which had aided and abetted in the misdeeds of the military was equally discredited. Mr. Bhutto could have—had he wished—made a clean break with the past and called on his country men to bury the past, abandon the policy of confrontation and devote their energies to the more worthwhile tasks of economic and social progress. This however would have implied acceptance on his part of the basic fact that Pakistan's leaders over the past quarter of a century had as a matter of deliberate policy sustained a hate-India campaign, in order to perpetuate their own rule, although India had not harboured any ill-will towards Pakistan.

In time Pakistan's elite became prisoners of their own propaganda, and objectivity in assessing Indo-Pakistani relations had totally disappeared. To external powers this provided excellent opportunities for intervention in the affairs of the sub-continent. First, the United States and subsequently China exploited the situation fully. By extending military and economic aid to Pakistan in return for providing her with bases for monitoring Russian and Chinese air space and communications, the United States during the Fifties gained full and direct control over Pakistan's policies. Indirectly, by becoming Pakistan's arms supplier, the USA at the same time acquired powerful influence over India. By increasing or reducing the quantum of arms supplies to Pakistan, the USA could regulate the security threat to India, thus compelling India either to earmark disproportionately large sums for defence or adjust its policies to suit the USA.



This was the problem facing India's leadership during the Dullesian era. By about 1959 it would seem that the USA was beginning to become disenchanted with Pakistan—although Pakistan continued to be referred to as America's staunchest and most loyal ally. In 1961 any hopes that America may have had of obtaining from Pakistan quid pro quo for the massive military and economic assistance and political support received, had to be given up as President Ayub Khan declined to entertain American requests for Pakistani troops in Laos, on the ground that Pakistan felt threatened by India and needed every man at home. Later in 1962 when India was attacked by China, America was considering the question of providing this country with defence equipment on a very moderate scale. Pakistan vigorously protested and succeeded in forcing America to drop the proposal. Nor was this the only instance when Pakistan was able to have its own way despite American views to the contrary. At the time of China's invasion of India, President Kennedy sought an assurance from President Ayub to the effect that he would not create further difficulties for India. Ayub not only did not heed America's call but chose the opportunity to press his demands for annexing the whole of Kashmir, on the principle that India's difficulty was Pakistan's opportunity.

By 1965 American disenchantment with Pakistan was almost complete. Yet such was the momentum generated by over a decade of arms aid that powerful Pakistan lobbies had grown up within the State Department and the Pentagon. These lobbies did their best to espouse the cause of Pakistan and ensure that arms inflow into Pakistan continued, though on a reduced scale—despite the official policy banning arms supplies and despite Pakistan's advocacy of China's cause while herself nominally remaining within SEATO and continuing to derive full benefits therefrom.

#### FURTHER CHANGE

The events of 1971 have brought about a further change in America's attitude towards Pakistan. First America has no longer the strategic need to locate air and communication bases in Pakistan. Second, Pakistan's utility as a lever against India has diminished considerably. Third, Pakistan's rulers having based their national strategy on the premise that their and China's interests in the sub-continent coincide, whatever America does or fails to do in the sub-continent is unlikely to deflect Pakistan from its chosen path. Fourth, America herself following President Nixon's visit to Peking has recognized Peking's special interest in the region and hence America could free herself gradually from her disastrous role as arms supplier to Pakistan. Finally American policy makers must have discovered

that at least in areas of marginal interest for her, America would obtain a better pay-off by threatening to arm a client's rival than incurring the expenditure—and the odium—of arming a difficult client State.

It would, therefore, seem reasonable to expect that America will not probably rearm Pakistan either directly or on a massive scale unless there is a radical change in the international situation.

American pronouncements that the embargo on military supplies to Pakistan still stands, and the withdrawal, without replacement as yet, of the Arms Aid Administrator in Rawalpindi-General Charles Yaeger, underscore this.\*

The subject of American arms supplies has been discussed at some length, since this factor more than anything else would determine the size, composition and strike potential of Pakistan's armed forces. Although the danger of direct supply of American arms to Pakistan appears to have receded, the possibility of "surplus" US arms finding their way into Pakistan through CENTO, other West Asia States or even NATO sources cannot be ruled out.

Since 1966, China has emerged as Pakistan's major arms donor, and France as the supplier of sophisticated weapon systems, (Mirage aircraft, Daphne submarines, helicopters and missiles). Assuming that the inflow of American arms would be marginal, the build-up and sustenance of Pakistan's armed forces would depend on the surplus arms available in China both in terms of depot stocks and its production capacity on the one hand and, on the other, on Pakistan's ability to mobilise free foreign exchange to pay for arms deliveries from France. We will revert to this point later.

#### ARMS BUILD-UP

Pakistan traditionally has been strict in ensuring that details regarding the arms received by it from abroad are not published either within the country or outside. Thus it was not until 1967 long after USA decided to place an embargo on arms supplies to Pakistan that officials of the Department of Defence were prepared to mention to Senate Committees the extent of arms gifts made to Pakistan. International reference manuals and Peace Associations interested in controlling the spread of sophisticated weapons have tended to underestimate Pakistan's arms holdings and troop strengths. This is presumably because the data is based on information that Pakistan itself provides.

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\*This was written before the American announcement that the supplies contracted for earlier would be honoured. *Ed.*



An estimate of Pakistan's armed forces strength as at the beginning of this year can be arrived at by going back to 1965 and deducing present strength from Pakistan's Order of Battle at that time and making due adjustments for war losses, other wastages, acquisitions of weapons and equipment and raisings of new formations since then. A fairly reliable estimate of the position as it obtained in 1965 is that Pakistan then was able to field a land force of seven infantry divisions and two armoured divisions in the West and a force of one and a half infantry divisions plus the equivalent of a regiment of tanks in the East. The strike element of this force consisted of 1100 tanks.\*\*\* Pakistan's Air Force consisted of two hundred combat aircraft\* based mainly on the F-86 Sabre jet and supported by two squadrons of B-57 bombers and a squadron of F-104 Star-fighters.\*\*

Assuming that 1965 war losses and normal wastages totalled 400 tanks and 70 aircraft, Pakistan's strike weapons early in 1966 probably stood at 700 tanks, including about 200 light tanks and about 130 combat aircraft.

During the period 1966-1970, inflow of major weapon systems totalled at least 610 medium tanks (200 T-54s from Russia; 210 T-59s from\* China, 100 M-47s from Turkey and another 100 M-47s from other NATO/CENTO sources); and over 216 high-performance combat aircraft (90-F-86 Sabre jets from West Germany via Iran; 36 Mirage-Vs from France and 90-MIG-19s from China. The Sabres were transferred to Pakistan with the US Administration's tacit approval despite the official US embargo on arms supplies to Pakistan.\*\*\*)

General Yahya Khan opened his 1971 campaign with a force estimated at twelve first-line infantry divisions with one more committed to internal security duties, plus two armoured divisions in the West and a force of three and a half infantry divisions supported by two armoured regiments in the East. Effective tank and air strengths were about 1100 tanks, 300 APCs and about 350 combat aircraft. War losses in December 1971 were about 220 tanks and 90 aircraft. As against this Pakistan has already received at least 100-M-47 tanks from West Asian countries and 100 T-59s from China. A further 100 T-59s have also probably been received. As for aircraft, 30 Mirage-Vs—being part of the 1970/71 order for 60 aircraft—appears to have been received. So have 60 MIGs from China. During December 1971, four F104s from Jordan, five F-5s from Libya and 20 F-86s

\*\*\*Arms Trade with the Third World, 1971" (SIPRI Publication) PP 490 et. seq.

\*\*SIPRI Year Book 1972. pp. 136.

\*\*\*Hearings before the sub-committee on Near East and South Asia of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee-Mar-Jun 1967.

from Saudi Arabia were received. According to Pakistani sources\* Pakistan has been promised a total of 400 MIG-19s from China\*. Hence the Pakistan Air Force may be strengthened by the addition of a further 250 MIG-19s. Likewise a follow-up order for 75 more Mirage-Vs appears to have been placed with France.

Thus Pakistan could immediately field an armoured force of about 1300 tanks, and an air force consisting of about 380 combat planes. These could be augmented by further supplies of 250 MIG-19s from China and 75 Mirages from France. In addition following General Tikka's visit to Peking, China may be giving TU-16 bomber aircraft as well.

Mr. Bhutto himself has declared that Pakistan's war losses have been more than made up. A regular land force of about seventeen divisions together with an armoured force of 1200 to 1300 tanks appears to have been brought up to readiness.

#### MILITIA FORCES

This formidable force is being supplemented by militia forces whose exact strength has probably not yet been finalised. Earlier reports suggested that a militia of 200,000 would probably be raised, of which a force of 50,000 appears to have been already recruited and is being trained for infiltration operations.

More recently, Pakistan's administration has announced plans for transforming Pakistan into a 'nation at arms' pursuant to which a very large militia (Mujahid force) is to be raised, as also a Home Guard (Janbaz force) besides an expanded NCC and a Women's Guard.

These citizen forces under President Bhutto's scheme of things would have a dual role. The Mujahids—at any rate selected units of the Mujahids—would receive intensive training and be available for infiltration operations. The rest of the Mujahids would be available for internal security duties to supplement the armed constabulary. The Janbaz force, the NCC and Women's Guard would essentially constitute the military wing of President Bhutto's P.P.P.

This rapid force build-up at a time when the country has been beset with many economic difficulties arising from the loss of a captive market and foreign exchange earner in Bangla Desh, suggests that Pakistan has striven to retain the option of staging a conventional assault on this country and/or

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(\*SIPRI Year Book 1972 pp. 136)

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(\*SIPRI Year Book 1972 pp. 136)



staging a massive infiltration operation into Kashmir to seize that part of the Indian Union.

Frequent reports of Pakistan army officers going to China for training in guerilla operations lends substance to this view. General Tikka Khan has concluded his ten-day visit to China, heading a high-power delegation consisting of senior representatives of the three Services. Apart from promises of arms gifts, he seems to have secured China's commitment to the setting up of small arms and tank factories in Pakistan. He would also no doubt have secured China's promise for setting up aircraft maintenance factories if not a factory for assembling aircraft. When these factories are set up and begin production, Pakistan would be self-sufficient at least in weapons for the land forces.

A matter for immediate concern is the hope expressed by China's Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Chang Tsai-Chien, who acted as Tikka Khan's host at Peking, that there would be "increased cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries". Very much could be implied in this seemingly simple statement. *Indian defence planners would need to assume that Tikka Khan's Peking visit has ushered in an era of active Sino-Pakistan military consultations and even operational coordination under certain eventualities.* These may cover a wide spectrum ranging from China ordering troop movements along our borders (as in 1965) through staging small scale operations at selected points on our Northern or Eastern borders to the planning and conduct of regular joint operations with Pakistan in the Ladakh or Gilgit sectors.

The probability of full-scale joint operations may at the moment appear low. Nevertheless it would be unwise to ignore the possibility.

#### DOMESTIC COMPULSIONS

The internal situation in Pakistan is still very unsettled. This is largely because of the manner in which Pakistan's army sought to put down the autonomy movement in what was East Pakistan has created apprehensions in the minds of the people of the minority provinces—NWFP, Baluchistan and Sind—about their own future. The leaders of these provinces as well as the Urdu-speaking people concentrated largely around Karachi and Hyderabad (Sind) are openly discussing the problem of 'nationalities' within Pakistan, and the need for defining precisely the rights and obligations of different groups.

It would have been an act of high statesmanship on the part of President Bhutto if he had recognised the legitimate concern of the people of



minority provinces and met their demands for autonomy at least half way. This would have allayed suspicions and enabled the people of all provinces and of different political persuasions to work in harmony for the development of Pakistan. But such an approach would mean focusing attention on Pakistan's problems to promote the welfare of the people of the country as a whole and by the same token placing reduced emphasis on defence build-up, and giving up the policy of confrontation with a neighbouring country.

President Bhutto's policy of defence build-up, including the projected raising of several categories of national militia, is in large measure internally oriented. It is no secret that even as early as 1969/70, political groups in Pakistan had been quietly arming their followers. This, perhaps, increased in tempo after the 1971 debacle. Mr. Bhutto's followers themselves probably set the pace following Mr. Bhutto's appointment of former General Akbar Khan as his unofficial military adviser. In the Frontier Province, the followers of Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan (Muslim League, Qayyum Group) have also armed themselves. So have other political groups in the Frontier as well as in Baluchistan. Latest reports speak of armed clashes between Mr. Abdul Qayyum's followers and the established NAP coalition government of Baluchistan.

Mr. Bhutto's courting of the army, and strengthening it is to be seen as a step to provide himself with the means to control the turbulent Frontier Province and Baluchistan in case of a showdown. President Bhutto is also aware of the limitations of the armed forces as well as the dangers of Bonapartism, if armed forces are strengthened beyond a point.

Given the characteristics of the Pakistani soldier—still predominantly the West Punjabi from a few districts of West Punjab and selected tribes from the North Western Frontier—Pakistan's army is an extremely undependable instrument for employment in the North Western Province, or even in Baluchistan, in the event of any large-scale political unrest within the country.

Thus while strengthening the armed forces to win over to his side the conservative elements as well as certain external powers, President Bhutto has also sought re-insurance by trying to create large militia forces. If these militia forces are officered by his PPP men or others trusted by him, he will have at his disposal a powerful and broad-based "people's force" with which he can dominate the politics of all regions within the country without having to call in the Army to help him in maintaining internal order.

## ONE PARTY RULE

This could well lead Pakistan to a one-party dictatorship. Friends of Pakistan may deplore these portents suggesting a possible drift towards absolute dictatorship, but it concerns primarily the people of Pakistan. However, Indian concern arises from the fact that the rapid strengthening of Pakistan's forces, the raising of a militia, arming them and converting them into party instruments could create deep internal stresses. To divert public attention, Pakistan's rulers, as in the past, may attempt to keep up anti-India hysteria. This in turn would generate new tensions and may lead them into adventures against India.

While the fear of internal turmoil may act as a trigger for sparking off another Pakistani attack, certain external events also could have the same unfortunate result. Among these are the resumption of large-scale military aid to Pakistan by America. Should this occur, Indian defence planners would have to work on the premise that sooner or later Pakistan would initiate aggressive action. Fortunately, American policy appears now to accord a fairly low priority to South Asian affairs. But there is no room for complacency. Another and even more significant danger in the short term is China's continued military support to Pakistan. 210-T-59 tanks and 150 Mig-19 planes have already been delivered, as also complete equipment for two infantry divisions. Equipment for three more infantry divisions may also be given. If another 250 MIG-19s (and perhaps some TU-16s) are to be supplied soon, Pakistan may feel tempted to consider a pre-emptive strike once again. Further, if Chinese leaders however indirectly give Pakistan the impression that they will undertake parallel action if Pakistan attacks Kashmir, the danger to India will be very serious.

Serious as the general situation could be, peace can be preserved if Indian defence planners ensure that our defence forces have sufficient muscle to convince Pakistan that aggression will not pay. This would call for ground, air and naval strike strength with at least a two to one margin vis-a-vis Pakistan while having enough strength to hold our northern borders. Such a posture will also convince external powers of our determination to defend our borders vigorously and make them less inclined to underwrite Pakistan's aggressive policies.

It would also be the most economical policy from all points of view.

# INDIA AND THE BALANCE OF POWER

MAJOR K BRAHMA SINGH

**I**F you wish for peace, understand war", writes Captain Liddle Hart. What he implies is that to ensure peace we must understand the nature of a future war and prepare for it. While preparation for war acts as a deterrent, understanding the nature of the future war ensures the effectiveness of such a deterrent. No wonder the stress is on understanding. When he rewrote his line as "If you wish for peace, understand war; particularly guerilla warfare", Hart stressed further the need to understand future wars, and also indicated that such wars will mostly be guerilla wars. This may not appear quite true in the context of what we have seen of wars so far, but it does not in any way alter the concept of understanding the future war and building an effective deterrent for ensuring peace.

The nature of a war depends on the enemy one has to fight. All countries engage themselves in serving their economic and political interests. Human beings and nations being what they are, such a pursuit is bound to lead to a clash of interests. Every country must, therefore, have a defence strategy to protect its economic and political interests. By a careful and analytical study of international behaviour during peace, the inevitable enemy, the nature of the future war and the appropriate deterrent necessary to prevent such a war could be accurately assessed.

The concept of balance of power aims at establishing this deterrent for peace. Whatever peace that exists today is because of the balance of power that obtains between potential enemies. Conversely all wars result directly from military imbalances between the contending parties. All countries, therefore, base their defence policies on the concept of balance of power, whatever their outward professions may be. Indeed many cases of international behaviour that are otherwise inexplicable, are easier to understand when viewed in light of the concept of balance of power.

Unfortunately for us, if there is anything that evokes general indignation in our country, it is any reference to the concept of balance of power. This is because there is no Chanakya now in this country and we today live under the spell of Utopian idealism, which prevents us from grasping the reality "that is".



## THE CONCEPT

The concept of balance of power implies that the armed strengths of potential enemies be so balanced as to deter one from taking recourse to war as a means of settling disputes. The forces being balanced, decisive victory is assured to neither and wars become pointless. The balance of power not only makes chances of victory 50 : 50, but also threatens to cripple even the marginal victor so badly that neither side is tempted to take a chance. On the other hand, when there is military imbalance between contending parties, the militarily stronger is tempted to use force—the quickest way of settling disputes. Whatever the outward excuses for wars, the root cause is military imbalance. The peace that exists today between Russia and America inspite of grave provocations from each other, is due to the balance of power between the two. On the other hand, we faced an invasion from China because of the military imbalance between us and the Chinese. In the case of Pakistan, although directly there existed a balance of power between us, there was complete imbalance between us and Pakistan and China put together. It was therefore again this imbalance that started the wars. That China did not join the affray is another matter. As a matter of fact wars flow out from military imbalances as a law of nature as much as low lying areas get inundated during floods.

The whole concept is based on the solid fact of life that even at the height of civilization, the laws of the jungle, might being right and the survival of the fittest, still rule the world. Even during the short span of 25 years of our freedom, world events have amply demonstrated that political power does grow out of the barrel of the gun. After all what is the basis of the power of veto with the "Big Five"? Or for that matter, what is the basis of their being considered "big". It is certainly not their size or population; but sheer military might. These countries use their political power, (which they have attained through military might), not only for looking after their bonafide interests but also for expansionistic designs or enlarging spheres of influence. But even if a country does not have imperialistic aims it would still need political strength as a measure of self-defence. Consequently every country would require adequate armed strength to ensure the necessary political power. The quantum of armed strength so required will be decided by what ensures the balance of power.

## INDIRECT METHODS

A country striving to maintain the balance of power may do so directly or indirectly. Directly by developing its war potential to such an extent as to leave no doubt in the mind of the adversary that starting a war by him

would not be worth while. And indirectly by actively supporting all that could prevent the potential enemy from growing stronger or that which would keep him militarily occupied elsewhere. One way of achieving this would be by helping the enemy's enemy either directly or by just adding fuel to the fire. This would also include supporting insurgencies within the enemy country. While the direct method costs money and could put a strain on the country's economy, the indirect method, which is mostly diplomacy, costs little. So, although balance must primarily be maintained directly by acquiring an effective military deterrent, indirect methods could be employed with great advantage to supplement this.

Matching the military strength with that of the potential enemy is not purely a mathematical calculation. The ability of a country to resist aggression is as much dependent on the form of its strategy, tactics, and the will to fight, as on the strength of its armed forces. Matching the potential enemy's strategy, tactics and will to fight is, therefore, as important in maintaining the balance of power as matching the armed strength. This is how Israel, with armed forces below par with her enemies, is not only maintaining the balance but has even a little tilt in her favour. For us this type of thinking would be necessary while we are matching our strength with the Chinese threat.

Balance of power may also be maintained jointly by two or more countries with common interests against a common enemy through defence alliances (or whatever one may like to call them). There are, however, certain prerequisites to such arrangements in order that they may succeed. The prime one is that the alliance must be between equals and both must derive equal benefits out of it. This is necessary to prevent exploitation of one by the other and the consequent break-up of the alliance. It was perhaps due to this prerequisite not having been fulfilled that many alliances broke up in the past. In any case alliances are of necessity a temporary measure. It is said that there are no permanent friends among countries but only permanent interests. Alliances will therefore last only as long as they serve the interests of allied countries. Alliances that are maintained by force by a Super Power with its satellites amounts to downright imperialism and do not fall under the purview of this subject.

Unfortunately there are no set rules to this game of balancing power and every country plays it its own way. There being no accurate measure of assessing a country's armed potential, there is much scope for rationalisation. Even the most belligerent who is hell bent on upsetting the balance for furthering imperialistic designs does so on the pretext of maintaining it.



This is the reason why the concept appears to smack of imperialism. No wonder the idealists condemn it. The more worldly condemn it too. Not because they do not believe in the necessity for maintaining the balance of power. Some do so to cover their imperialistic aims and others to avoid being maligned and unjustifiably being branded imperialist. In practice, however, they all base their policies on the concept of balance of power; whether it be for maintaining it or tilting it in their favour. As a cover they may have to use high sounding slogans like "moral obligations", "fighting imperialism", "saving democracy" and what not, but it is balance of power for all.

### INDIAN INTERESTS

We in India have nothing to feel guilty about. We too need political power and consequently a military deterrent for safeguarding our national interests. Somehow we have a tendency to associate all political power with imperialism. This is not correct. Excessive and unchallenged political power may be employed for attaining imperialistic objectives, but by itself political power is not imperialistic. Some political power is absolutely essential for ensuring that bonafide interests of a country are not sacrificed by might becoming right. The mere righteousness of a cause is no guarantee of its success. World opinion has time and again proved to be ineffective in its role of settling issues and ensuring peace. The cause of the people of Bangla Desh is but one glaring example. The conscience of the most ardent of our idealists should start pricking them if and when we show signs of so overgrowing as to pose a threat to others; and not now when we are so much below strength in comparison with the existing threat from our neighbours. We must keep growing militarily till we balance the forces that are threatening our national interests. Maintaining of balance of power should in fact form the basis of our defence objectives just as it does for others.

Some of the major Indian interests that would require the backing of political and military power are :

- (a) ensuring territorial integrity ;
- (b) equitable solution to political disputes with some neighbouring countries;
- (c) defending democracy ;
- (d) preservation of political freedom ; and
- (e) protection of lines of communications on the seas.

#### TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

Three States of the Indian Union — Kashmir, Arunachal and Nagaland—are strategically important and therefore a source of interest to more than one country. Some of these countries cannot keep their greedy eyes off these States and pose a perpetual threat to the territorial integrity of our country. We would naturally require much political and military strength to meet this threat.

#### POLITICAL DISPUTES

Political disputes between neighbouring countries are bound to occur, but there are some that are deliberately created by the militarily strong for using as a pretext to commit aggression with motives that have nothing to do with the dispute as such. We have such types of disputes with China and Pakistan. (Pakistan has all along been considering herself stronger than India on the basis of the strength of her allies and her fanatical ego of possessing superior soldiers). Such disputes (for obvious reasons) cannot be sorted out across the conference table. We would need force to keep our opponents at bay.

#### DEFENDING DEMOCRACY

India is the largest democracy in the world and by virtue of this a special responsibility devolves on her. In India's strength the enemy's of democracy (it is a pity that the US has to be one of them), see a source of inspiration for the smaller ones whom they would like to bring under their sway. It is but natural that India should be the first target of attack for all anti-democratic forces. In its size and population also India possesses the potential for challenging the supremacy of the "Big Five" and must naturally be a source of worry to them. We have to protect ourselves from these powers.

#### PRESERVATION OF FREEDOM

With Big Powers trying to carve out for themselves spheres of influence for serving their political, economic and defence interests, preservation of political freedom by developing countries has become a big problem. The two main strangleholds of these Powers are economic and defence aid. There can be no aid without strings no matter who is giving it and who is receiving it. There is no "ism" greater than nationalism, and every country, whatever its outward professions, has its national interests foremost in all its international dealings. A country seeking political freedom must be able to stand on its own feet; if not economically at least in matters of defence. What is applicable to others is applicable to us also.

## LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS

Protection of lines of communications through the sea is a matter of grand strategy in national defence. A war on land may well be lost only due to the inability of a country to protect its lines of communication. This is how Pakistan lost to India. Vulnerability of the lines of communications is not at times realised till they are actually blocked when hostilities break out. We must realise how vulnerable our lines of communications through the Indian Ocean are and that safety of our sea routes is one of our major interests.

## POWER POLITICS

To appreciate what India is up against in safeguarding her national interests it would be necessary to analyse the power politics on the Indian sub-continent. As is the case with other regions, here too the main contestants are America, China and Russia. Normally it is very difficult to see through the game that each of these Powers plays, but what happened on the Indian sub-continent was so sudden that it took the world by surprise and completely exposed the politics of the Big Powers. India has many lessons to learn from what has come to light.

## THE AMERICAN INTERESTS

When the US moved the 7th Fleet into the Bay of Bengal against the Indian Navy, the feelings in India were more of shock than fear. In spite of the differences in opinion between India and the US, Indians by and large had never had any ill-will against America. What shocked them was that a country that had rushed unconditional help to them during the Chinese invasion had joined China against India. The "Saviours of democracy" not only closed their eyes to the acts of barbarism committed by the Pakistani dictatorship on the defenceless people of Bangla Desh, but aided these by providing unqualified support (material and moral) to the Pakistani military junta. The spate of articles that appeared in the Indian Press was certainly indicative of the shocked feelings of the country but few could find an explanation for this type of behavior on the part of the American Government.

The American conduct is, however, not difficult to explain if their interests were to be properly analysed. The prime interest of the US is to contain Russia and China. What better method of containing both could there be than to balance one against the other? Russian strength thus tied up with China would eliminate or at least reduce the Russian challenge to American supremacy in the world. A strong India, on the other hand,



which could by itself balance with China would relieve the Chinese pressure on Russia and consequently increase the Russian pressure on America. America would naturally not like to see India strong and as a check would wish Pakistan to balance with India. Throwing ideals (and which country has any) to the winds, America had therefore to support Pakistan against India out of pure self-interest. When she had supported us against China in 1962 at that time conditions were different. Russia and China were still brothers (as Khrushchev put it then) and the Chinese might was growing unchecked. India was the only country that could check it.

The other reason why America would not like India to grow unchecked may be that she sees in India the potential that Napoleon saw in China when he said "Let China sleep; for when she wakes the world will be sorry". This is perhaps not without justification but for what America is doing to India today she might be the sorriest of all. In any case, as things stand today, America's hostility towards India is likely to continue. In pursuance of this policy she had no option but to recognise Bangla Desh and wean her from India. She did it unabashedly though and announced her recognition even before the 7th Fleet could return to its original position. The CIA and the famous American dollar will do the rest. She may have earned a little bit of Pakistan's ill-will but with Pakistan firmly in her grip she can afford it. Time and dollar will heal as usual.

#### RUSSIAN INTERESTS

The Russian interests are just the opposite of American interests. Russia would wish India to be strong for the same reason that America would not. A strong India that could balance with China would free Russia to deal with America. Further, Russia too sees in India the potential that Napoleon saw in China, and with America trying to seek alliance with China against Russia, what better partner than India could Russia have for maintaining the balance of power? Indo-Russian friendship will, therefore, last as long as the Sino-American collusion lasts.

#### THE CHINESE INTERESTS

The Chinese interests are based on their general declared policy of fomenting world revolution, meaning in fact world domination by Peking. China too has realised India's military potential and in India's strength she sees a serious challenge to her supremacy in Asia. She also knows how Russia is grooming India to pose this challenge to her. China's interests have, therefore, coincided with those of America and that is the reason for this unholy alliance between the two to make Pakistan strong enough to check India's growth. It was thus that a "people's Government"

opposed all that it stands for (people's wars of liberation and what not) and shamelessly supported a military despot who created history in tyranny.

After Bangla Desh became a reality, China's interests lay in breaking up Indo-Bangla Desh friendship. It must be said to her credit that she has done a wonderful job of it, or at least better than what could be expected of her with the initial advantage lying with India. What is more, she has done this without loosening her grip on Pakistan. While she herself outwardly kept up unflinching support to Pakistan, her agents went into action in Bangla Desh nearly as soon as Yahya thought of surrendering. The agents, and the followers they have created by fishing in troubled waters, are too loyal to be shaken by the Chinese veto barring Bangla Desh's entry into the UN or for that matter her other anti-Bangla Desh actions. As a matter of rule the conscience of a pro-Chinese communist never pricks, (Maulana Bhashani is a living symbol of a thoroughly brainwashed and unscrupulous pro-Chinese communist), but those of their sympathisers whose conscience ever pricks can seek comfort in a large variety of anti-Indian slogans that have been provided to them to choose from.

#### INDIAN INTERESTS

For obvious reasons India's interest lies in seeing Bangla Desh free and friendly. It is, however, doubtful whether she is in a position to counter the prevalent power politics directed against both the freedom of Bangla Desh and her remaining friendly towards India. India has neither the know-how nor the resources to do so. She is solely dependent on morality for support. She feels that the fact that Indians have shed blood for the freedom of Bangla Desh is in itself a guarantee for everlasting friendship between the two peoples. It would have been so, had the people of Bangla Desh been allowed to think for themselves and not subjected to malicious anti-Indian propaganda by those who wish otherwise.

By hastening to withdraw her armed forces from Bangla Desh, India certainly won a great moral victory but it can also be termed as a diplomatic defeat. It would appear that we played into the hands of those who wanted to take advantage of Bangla Desh's helplessness without armed strength during the crucial period of instability. Even Bangla Desh, in her eagerness to show that she was free of foreign influence and thus qualified for world recognition, did not realise that by seeking immediate withdrawal of Indian troops she only helped the anti-national forces and made their task easier. No wonder that in spite of India sacrificing thousands of lives for the creation of Bangla Desh and the exemplary conduct of the Indian armed



forces (perhaps unparalleled in world history), anti-Indian slogans and anti-Government demonstrations started as soon as the last batch of Indian troops left Bangla Desh. No doubt Mujib and his government are solidly with India, but the support of a large section of the people has been subverted by the Chinese and the Americans. This should be a source of great concern for us. Governments come and go and do not matter as much as the people who make governments. We are perhaps lucky that at least one super power, capable of counter-acting the other two, wishes our people well.

### DEFENCE OBJECTIVES

India's defence objectives flow automatically from the study we have made of the power politics in the region. Primarily India too will have to base her defence objectives on the concept of balance of power but not the type of balance America and China would wish for. Our maintaining balance with Pakistan alone will not ensure peace in the region. With China and Pakistan acting in unison, the threat from one includes threat from the other. We must, therefore, be able to pose a deterrent to both. While maintaining balance with Pakistan amounts to just matching of our armed strength with theirs, with China we shall also have to cater for their fifth column.

It would also be worth examining the indirect methods of maintaining balance of power with our potential enemies. Some of these methods could be as under :

- (a) Actively supporting insurgencies
- (b) Actively supporting our enemy's enemies
- (c) Forming pacts for collective security.

### SUPPORTING INSURGENCIES

Both China and Pakistan have been actively supporting our insurgents. We react while they act. It is high time that we wrest the initiative from them and fling their weapon back at them. Both of them are very vulnerable in this regard and we could easily tie up a large portion of their armed strengths looking after their insurgents and save on our defence forces.

### SUPPORTING ENEMY'S ENEMIES

We must keep ourselves in readiness to go to the aid of any country in the region which might become a victim of Chinese or Pakistani aggression, rather than taking action only when we are attacked.

This we should do even though we may not have entered into a defence pact with these countries.

#### DEFENCE PACTS

Even with our best efforts it may not be possible for us to balance the forces that are poised against us and it may be necessary for us to seek collective security. For this we could enter into defence pacts with like-minded countries. Any pact that we may enter into must fulfill a prerequisite in that it should be between equals and should benefit all parties equally, lest the stronger partner be tempted to exploit his position. Our friendship pact with the Soviet Union is too lopsided and though it could be useful as an instrument for promoting friendship and co-operation between the two countries, it cannot form the basis of our defence objectives. There could be an effective defence pact only with countries that are also threatened with Chinese or Pakistani aggression.

A defence pact would particularly be necessary for ensuring the security of our lines of communications through the Indian Ocean. It may not be possible for us to raise a Navy strong enough to fill the vacuum in the Indian Ocean caused by the withdrawal of the British. Co-operation of countries in the region with common interests and who could make a common cause of it, is, therefore, necessary. The combined strength of India, Bangla Desh, Malayasia and Australia should be able to stand up to any challenge on the sea.

#### CONCLUSION

The only way of ensuring peace in the world is through maintaining the balance of power between potential enemies. Every country would, therefore, be justified to grow militarily to the extent that it ensures such a balance. What would not be justified is for any country to overgrow so as to tilt the balance in its own favour. Unfortunately there are no set rules to this game of balancing power and there is much scope for rationalisation. Even those engaged in upsetting the balance with imperialistic motives, do so in the name of maintaining it. The resultant involvement of peace-loving countries in an arms race is in fact only their struggle for existence and therefore fully justified. This is a necessary evil which should not perturb the idealists in our country.

We have all along been confused with regards to our defence objectives. These would become clear when viewed in the light of the concept of balance of power. We have some major bonafide political interests for protection of which we would require armed strength. The quantum of armed strength so required will naturally be decided by what would ensure an effective deterrent for our potential enemies; in other words that which would constitute the balance of power.

## THE FRENCH RESISTANCE, ITS EVOLUTION AND ITS ACTION\*

HENRI MICHEL

**B**Y Resistance we mean the struggle which the French continued to wage against the Germans and the Italians after the rout of the French army in June 1940, until the total liberation of the country, in violation of the Armistice Conventions and in opposition to the regime, which resulted from the defeat and was established in Vichy and which, on the contrary, carried out a policy of collaboration with the victor. It is remarkable that resistance movements should have sprung up and developed in all the countries of occupied Europe, and in my book "The Shadow War" I have attempted to define their main characteristics. It is also true, that under very different conditions, there were resistance movements in the Far East against the Japanese occupying forces. So one can deduce the rule, that every country, which is conquered and exploited by a foreign power, even when this power presents itself as a friendly one, gives rise to an opposition, which very quickly becomes violent, but in each country this resistance develops according to specific conditions determined by the history and the political, geographical, economic and demographic nature of each. Thus a certain number of features characterize the French Resistance.

First of all, it was divided between an open struggle outside the country, organized around General de Gaulle, who first of all took refuge in London and then went to Algiers within the group which he called "Free France"; and an obscure, secret struggle inside the country. Free France had an army, a flag and an embryonic government, the members of the underground resistance were volunteers, isolated for a long time, totally lacking in fighting equipment, considered as bandits by the occupying forces. This two sided aspect existed in a number of countries and, at the end of the conflict, sometimes, resulted in a civil war-as in Yugoslavia. Nothing of this sort took place in France, the two halves of the Resistance did not always understand each other, at times they mistrusted each other, but on the whole they did get on. The entire Resistance recognized and accepted General

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\*Lecture delivered at the premises of the United Service Institution of India on 1st March 1973.



de Gaulle's leadership, and the various political opinions of which it was made up, were represented in the Provisional Government which he formed and presided over, first in Algiers, and then in France during and after the liberation.

Another characteristic feature of the Resistance within the country was that it generally was oriented towards the left. This was due to the fact that the conservatives, the persons of influence, in other words the right, had rallied around the Vichy regime and its distinguished leader, Marshal Petain. However, all political groups had been split due to the defeat, some of the followers of the right had, because of nationalism, joined the Resistance, whereas some of the followers of the left, because of pacifism, had gathered around the Vichy regime, even going so far as to join the collaborationist groups. But, on the whole, the Resistance was politically the child of the communists, the socialists, the republicans, the Free Masons, the trade unionists and, socially, the representative of the middle classes, the workers and the peasants. This movement was patriotic, but also revolutionary, and underground papers like "Combat", although created by the middle class, naturally took as a profession of faith the title : "From Resistance to Revolution".

The Communist question appeared more acutely and more violently in France than in any other country. This was due to the fact that the Communists had unreservedly approved the pact that Stalin had signed with Hitler; but, at that time, France was at war with Germany, and this approval had been considered by the majority of Frenchmen as real treason. Things had become clearer after the attack of the USSR by Germany on June 22nd 1941, from then onwards the Communists became the most dynamic members of the underground Resistance, and it was they who carried out the greatest number of acts of sabotage and murders. But they were a cause of worry to many of their partners, who suspected them of wanting to take over power at the time of the liberation, besides this is in fact what they did in Central and Eastern Europe when these territories were liberated by the Red Army. However, in France, the Communists played the democratic card, they took part in General de Gaulle's government, and accepted the verdict of free elections.

What complicated the whole question in France, was the existence of the Vichy regime, that is to say not a government of the Quisling type in Norway which was entirely under the orders, and in the pay of the occupying forces, but a regime which had been legally put into power by the National Assembly, and which was legally recognized by all foreign powers, including



the U.S.A., the USSR and the Vatican. To begin with, Marshal Petain truly enjoyed the almost unanimous approval of the nation. The armistice forced him to oppose anything that might harm the occupying forces. The French Resistance was thus compelled to fight not only the enemy but also its own government, and the latter had formed special forces, the Milice, to hunt it down.

Due to the existence of the Vichy regime, apparently free to take its own decisions in the non-occupied half of France, and advocating collaboration with the conqueror, the harm done by the occupation forces as well as the possibility and means to fight against them, was not immediately apparent to the French. Hence, the distribution of a very great quantity of underground literature, more than 1,100 names of newspapers can be quoted; these newspapers, sometimes reviews and even books, "Les Editions de Minuit", gave war news, issued instructions on how to act and drew attention to crimes committed by the occupying forces.

It was around these publications that the first Resistance groups were formed. In fact, political parties, as well as the whole of the Third Republic, were discredited, being made responsible for the defeat, a disaster without precedent in the history of France. They reformed themselves within the Resistance and due to it, but to begin with, the Resistance was organized independently, if not even in opposition to them, by new men, and by groups considering themselves as non-political.

So, in France, there was a great danger of discord, and even of civil war. Members of the Resistance, both inside and outside the country, members of the Resistance against the collaborators but also against the followers of the Vichy regime, Communists against anti-Communists, Resistance groups against political parties, and all these were possible clashes. However, the situation developed peacefully and as smoothly as possible towards a wide unity. Such were some of the particular characteristics of the French Resistance. We shall now look at how it was born and how it developed.

Firstly, one must realize the significance of the defeat of the French Army in the Spring of 1940, in less than a month, and it was the same army that had won the 1914-1918 War. A million and a half young and fit men out of a population of 40 million, were to be prisoners of war for four years; a gigantic exodus had set more than 5 million people on to the roads; the administration had disappeared; the economy was at a standstill. Then, three departments (Alsace-Lorraine) were annexed by the Reich; three others were attached to Belgium; the rest of France divided into zones with different statutes; the forbidden, the occupied and the so-called free zones,

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separated by real frontiers, which were uncrossable. From one day to the next, France prosperous before the war, became a poor under-developed country; suddenly everything was lacking, food, clothing, heating and transport; unemployment was widespread and was forever increasing, with malnutrition and risk of epidemics. The spirit of the French was so obsessed by difficulties, so heavy and so new to them, that they had neither the time nor the wish to think of anything else.

Besides, the occupying forces were very cunning; they did not pillage and hardly ever plundered; their troops had orders to behave correctly. They were satisfied in imposing heavy compensation, theoretically for the maintenance of the occupation troops, but the total was so large that it would have been sufficient to feed 10 million soldiers. They used the surplus to buy everything they needed, machines, food, raw materials, stock of all kinds and labour, whereas the soldiers emptied all the shops, thanks to an advantageous rate of exchange for the mark. Thus Germany, gradually, took possession of France, even taking shares in the largest concerns, by paying with French money. The French, who received francs in exchange, were slow to seize the fact that they were in truth being dispossessed.

It must be added that the French people, had no experience whatsoever of underground activity, very different from for example the Poles. They had been totally free, in every sense of the word, for the last 150 years. Even under the despotic monarchy, the lampooners and the philosophers made fun of the regime. The French did not know how to plot, to hide or to keep quiet, there was in their history no example for them to follow, except the stories of the Hundred Years War; they had to find or invent their means of combat. They were also totally without arms, the material of the French army had been handed over to the conqueror.

Under these circumstances, public opinion was for a long time hesitant and divided. There was a feeling of violent anger against those responsible for the disaster; the Third Republic, the political parties, the political and even some of the military leaders. Whereas a minority could only see salvation in a close cooperation with Nazi Germany—this applied particularly to the collaboration groups in the Northern zone the great mass of the people had confidence in Marshall Petain, one of the victors of the 14-18 War, who advised patience, calm and inactivity and sought for an agreement with the victor, in order to alleviate the sufferings of the country.

The first signs of opposition thus came from the outside, from General de Gaulle, who had left for London as soon as he heard the request for an armistice. General de Gaulle was a great military theorist; but, in 1940,

he had hardly been heard of, the majority of the appeals that he made over the BBC were not heard. He did not succeed in stopping the signing of the armistice, nor was he able to convince the leaders of the Colonial Empire to enter the ranks of the opposition; scarcely a few thousand volunteers joined him and, amongst them, not a single well known personality. But the General had laid down for the future of France a different programme than that of the Vichy regime. By means of prophetic appeals, he announced that the war would be world-wide and that Germany had not yet won it. Some parts of the Empire, including French outposts in India, rallied to him; he set up a Committee which wanted to be a government, and the Free French Forces were to fight beside the Allies in every theatre of operations, the sky over England, the Atlantic, North Africa, the Soviet Union and the Pacific. General de Gaulle and his subordinates broadcast every day to the French, thanks to the BBC, and the French acquired the habit of listening to them and, so, learnt of the successes of the Allies, and were able to hope one day again to play a part in the conflict.

In France itself the first acts of resistance were the work of officers of the few units that the occupying forces had allowed the Vichy regime for the maintenance of order, the army of the armistice. Arms and material were hidden, officers infiltrated into the public services, and a secret mobilization prepared. This was the work of specialists having no relation with the mass of the population. Even if they were anti-German, these officers were also disciplined soldiers, and the policy of collaboration set up by the Vichy regime was a brake on their activities; they never had much effect, and disappeared on the occupation of the so-called free zone in November 1942.

The English, for their part, had sent agents, landed by submarine with the dual task of collecting information about the German forces and their plans, and organizing sabotage in their rear areas. Here again, it was only a question of small groups of specialists and not of a national Resistance. Besides, General de Gaulle from London blamed the French for accepting to work under the orders of an allied but foreign power. He himself sent missions and they were the founders of groups called "networks", depending directly on the Free French in London, some responsible for intelligence and others for organizing sabotage.

In France itself, however, opinion was changing; the action taken by the occupying forces and the Vichy regime particularly against the Jews gave rise to violent disapproval; the continuation of the war and the resistance of Great Britain gave fresh hope. Around the underground newspapers new movements were born which gradually grew, organizing demonstrations,



sabotage and helping escapes across the Pyrenees. But they were few, inexperienced, lacking money and weapons, and they ignored each others existence, and were even in competition one against the other.

A great step forward was made when, after the invasion of the USSR by the Wehrmacht the whole of the Communist party launched itself into underground activities. The Communists had the benefit of a long experience of underground activity, and they were well dug in all over France. They knew the language suitable to the masses, made up of social claims and patriotic enthusiasm. Besides, the Communist party advocated immediate action against the occupying forces, by means of demonstrations, strikes, sabotage, attacks on collaborators and enemy soldiers, all these operations were to be dearly paid for, because the invader exacted hostages and executions. At the same time, the party preached the largest possible union against the occupying forces, holding out its hand to the enemies of yesterday.

Thus a varied, divided and, still weak resistance, was born. The material means were lacking, and everything had to be obtained from outside, money, weapons, explosives; public opinion had to be mobilized in order to undertake an action of the masses and to convert what had been the more or less desperate action of a handful of men into the revival of the struggle by the whole of the French nation.

Its action, however, took various forms. In my opinion, of all the resistance movements in Europe, it was the one which had the most weapons at its disposal. It had, through experience, discovered the rules of psychological warfare. The morale of the population was galvanized by inscriptions on walls, especially the letter V for Victory, propaganda whispered from mouth to mouth and an ever increasing distribution of the underground press amongst the various classes of society; the student newspaper, "Defense de la France", printed a million copies; "Front National" published underground leaflets aimed at the various professional and social categories. When the invader decided to deport young Frenchmen to Germany to make them work there, the result was apparent, many were those who refused to go and hid at times in the middle of towns, but, more often, in the country and in the mountains. This propaganda also acted on the enemy soldiers, especially the non-Germans enlisted, more or less against their will, into the Wehrmacht, and resulted firstly in individual desertions, and then by the desertion of whole units on the company level, Croats, Muslims from Bosnia, Georgians, Ukrainians etc.....

Naturally, the Resistance tried to infiltrate the Vichy regime administration as far as possible; a special service called: "Noyautage des admi-



nistrations publiques" (N.A.P.) (The infiltration of public administrative services), was created. Its object was to discover, amongst the civil servants, those who were resistance minded, and those who were against, in order to recruit the former and neutralize the latter. It was thus that the taking over of power which was to coincide with the Allied landings was prepared, the opponents were to be eliminated and replaced by partisans who were qualified and prepared for the task expected of them. This form of action was particularly effective amongst the police, a great number of whom joined the partisans in the mountains. The uprising in Paris was set off by a strike of the police, who shut themselves up in the Police Head Quarters, and made of it a stronghold, in the midst of a still occupied city.

What also was a characteristic of the French resistance, was the great trouble it took in preparing for the post-liberation period, and the shaping of the future of France by means of reforms, rectifying the serious defects that the defeat had shown up. A number of eminent thinkers, philosophers, legal experts, historians and economists, formed study groups which presented, to the government in Algiers, plans for the constitution, educational reforms, the nationalisation of industries, economic planning etc. Provision was made for a return to a republican regime, but not to that of the Third Republic. Parliament was to be given less freedom of action, and the executive greater power, vast social and economic reforms, including a complete social security system, were prepared, most of these had but to be put into effect at the end of the war. Thus, the Resistance had the intention not only of working for the liberation of France, but also towards its revival, some even spoke of its renaissance, by giving power after the war to a new elite which had proved itself.

However, it was in its action against the occupying forces that the Resistance, by various means, asserted itself. France having twice found herself at the very centre of the allied strategy, at the time of the landings in Normandy, and again in Provence, the collection of information on the enemy forces, their movements and their morale were of vital importance. Consequently, intelligence networks were to be found in profusion in France, some were subordinate to the Free French, others depended directly on the English and the Americans. The new factor in this type of activity was that the members of the networks were no longer specialists, or slightly shady characters, as in traditional espionage, but Frenchmen from all walks of life, well placed to observe the enemy, and who had learnt how to do so. The intelligence thus collected was transmitted to London or to Algiers, either by radio after having been encoded, or in the form of reports, which reached Gibraltar or Switzerland, and were then carried on by airplane.

At the time of the landings, all the German coastal defences had been pinpointed, when the first flying bombs started to rain down on England, all the networks were switched on to locating the launching ramps, in order that these should be bombed.

Other networks, known as escape networks were used to help the departure from France, generally to North Africa via Spain, at times of people wanted by the occupying forces, Jews and members of the Resistance, and at times of Allied airmen shot down in combat, all these constituted a valuable asset which it was important to save. When the French army was reformed in North Africa, more than 20,000 volunteers, a great number of whom were officers went off there to enlist. At the cost of great danger and suffering, they got there, having crossed the Pyrenees secretly.

During this time, fighting groups attacked German soldiers and blew up installations used by the Germans: locomotive depots and railway lines, telephone wires, high tension electric cables, stocks of material, armament factories, electric power stations, bridges etc. The result was that the occupying forces felt that they were safe nowhere. They reacted by increasing the number of arrests, the destruction of houses and villages, the execution and deportation to concentration camps, but the very toughness of this behaviour turned the population against them, and had the paradoxical result of increasing the number of resisters.

At the request of the parties and the worker's unions, labour which was working for the Germans went in for specialized sabotage, stoppage of work, poor workmanship, switching of railway points. But it also showed its dissatisfaction by mass demonstrations, and often by strikes which disorganized production. Above all, those against forced labour in Germany pursued by the occupation forces, got together to defend themselves. Thus in most of the French mountains "maquis" were created, that is to say groups of partisans who were supplied with food and weapons by airdrops carried out by the allied air-forces. These "maquis" got their hand in, by attacking Germans sentry posts and small units on the move. In order to put an end to their activities, the occupying forces had to withdraw a certain number of trained units from the front, and to mount difficult and costly operations in the Jura, the Alps, the Massif Central and the Pyrenees.

The whole of these aggressive forces began to take on size and weight, but remained fragile, due to their extreme division, their separation into watertight groups and even the hostility which separated and opposed the various groups. The obvious interest of the Allies was to bring together these scattered elements, so as to be able to direct and orient them better.

But the Americans were very slow to understand the interest of this underground war, a type of combat which was worlds apart from the industrial war that they were preparing for; for them, the underground movement was a disturbing, weak, agitated, undisciplined, and revolutionary enigma. On the other hand, Roosevelt, who was badly informed, hoped for years that the Vichy regime, with the few forces which it still had, would join the allied camp, and the Resistance was very hostile to this regime, because it carried out a policy of collaboration with the occupying forces, while its police pursued them.

For his part General de Gaulle had always been certain that the Resistance should come under his orders. He felt that he alone, close as he was to the Allies, could command the Resistance, which if left to itself, he thought, would risk being destroyed by the Germans and their reprisals, and that, through lack of information and sufficient leadership, might undertake operations which would go counter the Allied plans. That is why on his own, without consulting the English, he had changed the title of his Free French movement to that of the Fighting French, which meant that he also commanded the fighters in occupied France, the members of the underground resistance.

But the latter did not always see things in this way. Certainly, none of them were against the General, all recognized that he had, by his prophetic appeal of the 18 June 1940, given the signal to the Resistance, and they thought that solid strong links must be established with him. Some, however, did not entirely know what to think of this authoritarian general who might turn out to be a dictator. The Communists had their own plans and wished to remain independent; they considered the General as an ally and not as a leader. The founders of the movement were gaullist in spirit, that is to say, that like General de Gaulle they condemned both the Third Republic and the Vichy regime; but they were very keen on remaining in command of their own troops, whom they had themselves assembled, they thought that, from outside, the General would provide them with the means with which to fight, but that he should leave the underground Resistance its independence. All these calculations were entirely foreign to the combatants at the bottom, who often did not know their own leaders. On the other hand, they got to know General de Gaulle who often spoke to them over the BBC, they were impressed by the clearheadedness of his appeals; little by little, the General had reassured most of them of his intentions, by proclaiming that, at the liberation, he would allow the French free to decide their own fate.



Under these conditions, unity was achieved by General de Gaulle and around him, in France and outside France. In France Jean Moulin, the very active representative of General de Gaulle, who was one of the finest figures of the French Resistance movement, succeeded in convincing the leaders of the various movements to coordinate their efforts, unify their troops and to recognize General de Gaulle as their leader. Going even further, he founded the "National Council of the Resistance", an organization which had no counterpart in the rest of Europe. Indeed, it gathered together as well as the representatives of the principal movements, eight in all, "the new men", delegates of all the political tendencies, from the Communists to the Conservatives, into which French public opinion was divided, as well as representatives of the two great worker's trades unions. It was the widest national union ever achieved in France, although the moderate members of the C.N.R. had few people behind them, and due to this fact, the new organization was distinctly left wing. In the eyes of General de Gaulle, the National Council of the Resistance was not an organisation to lead the Resistance, but a sort of Parliament, which allowed him to claim to the Allies that he had grouped the French nation behind him. All the members of the Council were not of this opinion, but at that point, they kept their reservations to themselves, unanimously declaring that they recognized the General as the head of the Resistance.

This allegiance gave General de Gaulle a lot more weight, when he addressed himself to his great allies. As he had few followers in Algeria, where the colonials were very close to the Vichy regime, he had been kept at a distance during the allied landing in November 1942. The Americans had dealt with the local authorities, who were on the spot, and in the end, had recognized the authority of General Giraud, a courageous soldier, but sharing the political opinions of Vichy, who ignored the Resistance and was subsequently not accepted by it. After a long rivalry lasting several months, in which the political fate of France at the liberation was at stake, General de Gaulle ended by winning out, becoming the sole President of the government formed in Algeria, on French soil, and which was successively to be called the French Committee of National Liberation and then the Provisional Government of the French Republic.

Henceforth, the underground Resistance was in touch with a real and strong French political authority, in consequence its unity was consolidated. The Provisional Government, like the National Council of the Resistance, gathered together representatives of the various opinions, including the members of the Resistance who had come from France. Its authority spread over the whole of the Colonial Empire, excepting Indo-China, but



including Corsica. It had diplomatic representatives abroad. It was, however only recognized by the Allies once it had returned to France, so great was the desire of the Americans not to appear to impose on France a regime which she had not freely chosen.

The Government of Algiers abolished the laws of Vichy in the territories which came under it, and republican law was re-established there. It summoned a Consultative Assembly, which prepared the post-war reforms. The Americans equipped a new French army, with more planes and tanks than that of 1939, although with less men, which played a great part in the Italian campaign. It evolved a transformation of the Colonial Empire into a French Union, which might have emerged into a Federation of States. Above all, it concerned itself with the part the French were to play in the liberation of the country, so impatiently awaited by all the French. With the landing of armies, and the coming into action of the secret army, it was of course understood that the liberation should be accompanied by the taking over of the country by the Resistance.

As the allied victory became apparent and the hour of liberation for France approached, in spite of the advertised union, fears, after thoughts, and mistrust, appeared. Resistants both within and without the country feared long drawn out battles, which would lay the country to waste, as well as a desperate eagerness on the part of the collaborators and supporters of Vichy to defend their positions and their lives, and this might take the form of a tough civil war. Numerous members of the Resistance wondered if General de Gaulle, arriving at the head of a victorious army, would not try to take over power and install a dictatorship; others feared that the Communist party, having at its disposal large armed forces would start up a political and social revolution, as had happened in Yugoslavia. General de Gaulle, for his part, did not wish to find himself faced with a revolutionary authority, stemming from street combat and bringing to France disorder and anarchy. But all members of the Resistance were in agreement on two points: they wanted to play an important part in the battles for the liberation of their country, and they would not admit that the supporters of Vichy and the collaborators should be allowed to remain in place and get off scot-free. Now the Allies, and the Americans in particular, made little of the military contribution of the Resistance, and mistrusted it politically, so they had planned to leave the Vichy authorities in place, and to back them up with a military administration, as they had done in conquered Italy. But, in France, they were in the country of an Ally.

We must first of all underline the important part the French played in **their own** liberation. In the North, an armoured division took part in the

Normandy battles, then liberated Paris and Strasburg; but, in the South, it was an army, as strong as the American army fighting by its side, which landed in Provence, liberated Toulon and Marseilles, then advanced up the Rhone, reached Alsace, crossed the Rhine and arrived in Austria. Such successes were a brilliant revenge for the severe defeats of 1940.

At the same time, the whole of France rose up in arms everywhere; roads and railway lines were cut, the Germans were attacked and skirmishes took place, and they were paralyzed in their movements by numerous strikes. Guerilla warfare, imprudently generalized since the 6th June 1944, was to be costly; in particular, vast assemblies of men insufficiently armed in the Alps and Auvergne, were dispersed with heavy losses, and severe reprisals on the civilian population took place. The result, however, was that the Americans were persuaded of the value of the help the Resistance could bring them, better equipped by them, the French Forces of the Interior were more successful after the 15th August, often on their own, they liberated vast portions of France and were the first to enter the towns; later they protected the flanks and the rear of the allied armies, to them finally came the task of reducing the Atlantic ports, where they overcame the last pockets of enemy resistance. An entirely symbolic event was the liberation of Paris by the French on their own; the F.F.I. started up the battle themselves and it was a French division who came to their aid and finished off their work.

On the other hand, the fears that had arisen proved to be groundless. A great part of the national territory remained outside the battle area, in particular, the collaborationist groups disappeared without fighting, often retreating with the Wehrmacht and even more often demobilizing themselves. As for the Vichy officials, they handed over their posts, without argument, to the men appointed by the Resistance. The latter found itself practically without difficulty with all the power in its hands. General de Gaulle reconstituted his Algiers government, taking in members of the National Council of the Resistance, and this government was finally recongized by the Allies as that of France. His first act was to decide that elections should take place at the end of the war, as soon as the prisoners returned, in order to choose the members of a Constituent Assembly responsible for preparing a constitution, which the country would then ratify. Democratic liberties were restored to the French.

A revolutionary atmosphere continued for several months, in a great part of the country, summary executions took place and personal scores were paid off. But public order was quickly re-established, and the country returned to work. Civil war, so greatly feared, had definitely been avoided.

The French people had paid dearly for their underground struggle; more than 20,000 people had been shot by the occupying forces; nearly 200,000 had been deported to concentration camps, half of whom never returned; tens of thousands of others were killed in combat. But the result of these sacrifices was that France took her place amongst the victors; first a French general signed the capitulation of the German armies, and then that of the Japanese armies. An occupation zone in Germany was given to France and a place reserved for her amongst the five permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations Organization; thus she found herself in the ranks of the great powers of the world.

In the field of internal politics, certainly the vast union, which had taken place during the struggle, did not survive the liberation; but it has left traces in public life, thus, the Communist party has in France played the democratic card; on the other hand General de Gaulle had remained the chief of a vast party which has not stayed within the usual limits of political parties; "gaullism" is a doctrine founded not only on admiration for an exceptional man, but also on a certain idea of France, in which the sense of general good and desire to serve the greatness of the fatherland dominate.

On the social and economic plane, the Resistance carried out very great reforms; the right to vote for women, the nationalisation of large firms and banks, the planning of the economy, the achievement of great works of public interest, the raising of the school-leaving age, the setting up of a Social Security Service for all, the organization of the exodus from the land etc.....

Thus the work of the Resistance was two-fold; it has contributed to giving France back its independence and liberty to the French people, whilst also transforming the country by modernizing it.



# THE ESSENTIALS OF GUERRILLA WAR.

COLONEL R.D. PALSOKAR MC (RETD)

THERE are different types of war. Clausewitz classified them into personal wars, joint-proxy duels, commercial wars and so on. The most horrendous is the nuclear war which man has so far successfully avoided if exception is made to the two atom bombs dropped on the ill-fated cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the Second World War. Conventional war tends to become total in this modern age due to the speed of missiles, the destructive power of the warheads, and the development of communications. This war is fought as much in the factories as on the battlefields and the common man gets physically and emotionally involved deeply in its conduct. Yet no other form of war captures the imagination of the people as the guerrilla war. The main reason for it is the direct participation of the people in this sub-limited war. The conventional war is fought between regular and trained armed forces of the belligerents. The man in the street is affected by it; yet he is looked down upon by the professional soldier who goes to the front and takes part in the actual fighting. The common man may contribute directly to the war effort by producing grains for himself and the soldiers, as well as by taking the supplies to the war fronts. He may even get wounded in an air raid or get killed in it. But he certainly misses the actual fun of fighting. The professional soldier does not take him into confidence on the plea that war is too technical and professional a game to be properly understood by an untrained person.

## PEOPLE'S WAR

A guerrilla war is a war waged by a section of the population for a 'cause' which is popular with the people. It is truly a people's war fought by a small band for a people's cause under the leadership of one who is accepted by the people as their leader. The people fight the professional soldiers and find that it is not after all that difficult to teach the trained a trick or two of their own profession. The men and women, both young and old, and even children become active guerrillas and give a good account of their tactical abilities which they learn the hard way. This lends a certain tinge of romanticism to the whole war and the sufferings are forgotten in



the midst of the thrill and excitement of fighting the professional soldier. This sustains the fighting spirit of the common man and he does not realise that he is paying a heavy price for this very expensive way of achieving the political aim. This type of war costs more in men though not so much in material and equipment which is generally won in battle from the professional soldier. If sufficient resources are available, the correct and most expeditious means of achieving victory in battle is to take resort to the conventional way of fighting and destroy the enemy by concentrating the men fire power and material at the right time and place, thus paving the way for further gains till final victory is won and the political goal attained.

The term guerrilla is of comparatively recent origin. The word came into use when the Spanish peasants fought the '*guerre*'—the battle—against Napoleon's regular forces. This form of warfare is as old as war itself which emerged out of this unconventional type. In this nuclear age it has acquired additional importance and earned a new name, the sub-limited war. When Super Powers find that they cannot resort to nuclear arms and cannot even threaten to use them for the fear that the threat itself may be misinterpreted for the resolve to attack and thus invite a pre-emptive strike, they look forward to continuance of the struggle by instigating or supporting a guerrilla movement. This type of war may be costly to the people who wage it; but not to a super power which does not mind another small nation sacrificing its own men for a cause of its own choosing.

#### LAWRENCE'S THEORY

In the First World War, Colonel T.E. Lawrence achieved international fame when he fought for Arab freedom from Mecca to Damascus. He was not one of the people, the Arabs, but successfully identified himself with their aims and aspirations. He dressed like an Arab prince in a gown of spotless white silk with headropes of twisted gold wire and carried a curved dagger in a gold scabbard at his waist. Physically extremely fit, he was lean, hard-muscled, capable of going for days without food or sleep, and of taking punishment that would have killed other men. He personally blew up over twenty trains and took part in a number of raids against the Turks and the Germans. He tried to theorise the nature of guerrilla warfare and came to the conclusion that the Turks did not have sufficient armed men to garrison the whole of Arabia. They needed to man a large number of strong points to retain control over the vast deserts over which the guerrillas led by him operated. He theorised as follows : "And how would the Turks defend all that? No doubt by a trench line across the bottom, if we came like an army with banners but suppose we were (as we might be) an influence, an

idea, a thing intangible, invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like gas? Armies were like plants, immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head. We might be a vapour, blowing where we listed. Our kingdoms lay in each man's mind; and as we wanted nothing material to live on, so we might offer nothing material to the killing. It seemed a regular soldier might be helpless without a target, only what he sat on, and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at."

Lawrence was not only a good soldier but also a good writer. He wrote his experiences in *'Seven Pillars of Wisdom'*. He took the maximum credit to himself and yet gave the impression of utmost humility. His campaign against the Turks was inspired more by the desire to influence the main battles by the British against the Turkish forces than by helping the Arabs to win independence for themselves although he identified himself with the Arab cause of nationalism as the war progressed. His reflections on guerrilla war came to be respected and studied by serious students of military tactics. He proved that armed irregulars can be used as a military instrument if properly led and if enthused with a 'cause'.

During the period of the two World Wars, Mao Tse-tung perfected the technique of fighting the guerrilla way. Mao was a better theorist than Lawrence. He saw clearly that the cause had to be political and also must be supported by the people. He put it thus in his *'Primer on Guerrilla War'*: 'Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, co-operation, and assistance cannot be gained'. To him guerrilla warfare is revolutionary in essence.

Mao fought a prolonged war with Chiang Kai-shek's forces from 1926 till both of them joined hands against the Japanese from 1937 to the end of the Second World War in 1945. Mao then took up his armed struggle against his old adversary, Chiang, and finally succeeded in establishing Communist rule on the Chinese mainland in 1949. Mao came up through the Chinese ranks and won the confidence of the people by dint of hard work.

During the Second World War, the guerrillas were active in most theatres. Notable amongst them were the Russian guerrillas who played havoc amongst the German occupation forces from early 1942 onwards. The Germans could not occupy the vast stretches of captured Russian countryside. They had to bypass large concentrations of Russian troops in the hope that they would either disintegrate or be mopped up later. Many of these troops donned civilian clothes and attacked German lines of communica-

tion from 1942. They normally took shelter in inaccessible woods and swamps which were difficult to comb for the Germans. Whether every Russian was a staunch communist was not the point at issue. What mattered to them was that the invaders were Germans who were aliens to them. The population gave willing support to these guerrilla bands and understood the 'cause'. Marshal Tito's partisans also played an important role in the struggle of Yugoslavia against the Germans. No less was the part played by the French underground movement in the later stages of the war.

In the post-war years, Castro won against Batista's army in Cuba-Che. Guevara not only theorised for the guerrillas but also practised what he preached. He laid great emphasis on popular support to the movement. Guerrillas were active in the mountains in Greece, they fought in the jungles of Malaya and Indo-China. Even in a small country like Cyprus they caused destruction to government forces out of proportion to their strength.

In South-East Asia, the Vietnamese peasants had long been exploited by the French and the Japanese; by the latter during the Second World War. The people were poor and illiterate. They lacked arms. Their French masters had never allowed them to keep them. They did not possess the experience and training to fight the well-trained and fully-equipped French army. Yet when oppression became unbearable, these simple people rose as one man and made up their arsenals from what they captured from their alien rulers. Initially the French thought that it was easy to fight the unarmed people. All they had to do was to occupy centres of communication and patrol the countryside with mobile troops. In actual practice they discovered that they had to occupy the whole country. For, wherever they were not physically present, the guerrillas used those areas as their bases. Occupation of the entire region meant dispersion of forces which became vulnerable to attack by the guerrillas. When they were regrouped and concentrated at places of strategic importance, the guerrillas increased their strength in the unoccupied places and organised raids on small detachments; ambushed convoys and cut road communications. This increased the cost of maintaining large forces which had to be supplied from the air. Gradually the guerrillas built up their strength till they raised regular troops and launched major attacks. The end came at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Says General Vo Nguyen Giap who led the Vietnamese people : "Guerrilla war is the form of fighting by the masses of a weak and badly equipped country against an aggressive army with better equipment and techniques... Guerrillas rely on heroic spirit to triumph over modern weapons, avoiding the enemy when he is the stronger and attacking him when he is the weaker. Now



scattering, now regrouping, now wearing out, now exterminating the enemy, they are determined to fight everywhere, so that wherever the enemy goes he is submerged in a sea of armed people who hit back at him, thus undermining his spirit and exhausting his forces...." The emphasis is on submerging the enemy in a sea of armed people. That is why he laid stress on the guerrillas maintaining good relations with the people. In the Oath of Honour that the guerrillas had to take, it was said, "In contacts with the people, to follow these three recommendations: to respect the people; to help the people; to defend the people".

### PAK GUERRILLAS

Since a few years after independence, the Indian Army too fought against some hostile elements on the north-east frontiers of the country. These hostiles did not get adequate popular support and they lacked a 'cause'. These were the primary reasons for their failure although they received aid from China and Pakistan. The army also fought the Pakistani guerrillas who entered Jammu and Kashmir through ungarded tracks in August 1965 before the actual commencement of the Indo-Pakistani war the next month. These guerrillas wore civilian clothes like the Kashmiri people. The outer jacket had a number of pockets which were used to keep ammunition grenades, food, currency and other requirements. The currency was to be used to pay the people for the supply of food, and for any services rendered, including giving of information. As soon as various guerrilla bands crossed the cease-fire line, their presence was reported by the local population immediately to the nearest army or police unit. When the army and the police started to track down these armed bands, the guerrillas tried to merge with the people. But they found to their utter dismay that the people were not with them. The guerrillas could not sell any worthwhile 'cause' to them. The people reported their presence wherever they hid. Thus these guerrillas bands met the same fate that awaits the fish out of water. The author had the pleasure to chase one such particular band and was struck by the co-operation the people extended to him than to the guerrillas. Such guerrillas who lack popular support and have no cause cannot be thrust on the people. It must be their own cause which normally emerges out of the oppression that the populace is subjected to.

The guerrilla operations of the Mukti Bahini were sustained by the people of Bangla desh. The political objective was provided by the Punjabi-dominated army of West Pakistan indulging in genocide in the then East Pakistan and thus helping unite the people against not only the army but

the whole of West Pakistan. The movement for liberation was swift because of fully developed signal and road communications.

### SHIVAJI'S TACTICS

The above brief historical survey covers mostly European and Chinese guerrillas of this century and brings out their dependence on the people. Many leaders of this era penned their thoughts for posterity. One great Indian guerrilla fighter who fought established order in the seventeenth century beats all the well-known practitioners of this art of war. He was Shivaji who roused the people of this land against foreign rule of over three hundred years standing in the days when communications were primitive and people were neither educated nor organised. He brought them together under his leadership over-riding petty jealousies and despite lures of spoils of office under the despotic rulers of Delhi and Bijapur. It was an Herculean task which he carried out in a society which was bigoted, superstitious and which had come to depend upon the whims of another fanatic religious group which ruled it with a firm and cruel hand. Consequently, every man fended for himself and groups became very selfish. People tended to look after their immediate interests and considered the miseries of their neighbours as no concern of theirs. They came to accept oppression by the Muslim rulers as a fact of life to be lived with. There appeared to be no cure for it. Their religion instilled in them the notion that the king was the incarnation of Lord Vishnu and hence could do no wrong. They explained away their miserable plight with the reasoning that it was due to their sins of commission and omission in the previous birth. In any case there was no appeal against the despotic and debauched rulers who collected taxes and themselves led an extremely ostentatious life. The 'cause' was there. It had existed there for the past few hundred years. Many men of lesser stature had tried to make use of it to gain independence. But they failed. Such were the circumstances under which Shivaji nursed the aspirations of the people and sought their sympathy as well as cooperation. Where it did not come forth voluntarily, he was ruthless enough to get it by force and eliminate the unwilling. He set before the people the goal of freedom and himself derived strength from the masses. Having awakened their national consciousness, he fought with the Muslim rulers with their help and assistance. Unlike Lawrence of Arabia who was not a man of the people, Shivaji the son of Shahaji Bhonsle, was a prince by birth and became acceptable to the people as a natural leader. He was thus a man of the people, who fought for the people with their active assistance.

Popular support is a must for the guerrillas as it enables them to move

freely amongst the people—like fish in water. It also makes their task of getting information of enemy movements easier. They have more ready informers than any other army ever has. People also ensure that the enemy is denied all knowledge of the intentions and moves of the guerrillas. To make sure that there are no enemies in dangerous places, some recalcitrant elements have to be eliminated. Shivaji killed Chandrarao More of Javli, Baji Ghorpade and a few others during his life time. This does not mean that terrorism by itself gives popular support to the guerrilla cause. It does not. It may help in procuring unwilling hands but voluntary information will not be freely available. If the people lose faith in the guerrillas the weak amongst them will be the first to go over to the forces of administration.

The need for popular support throws some responsibilities on the guerrillas. They must be a disciplined body of men and women who must remain on their best behaviour whilst dealing with the people. Mao Tse-tung wrote that the first rule to observe was that all actions were subject to command and the second was that they should not steal from the people. When the guerrillas depend upon voluntary aid from the people for their supplies, food, shelter and money they cannot afford to alienate them by misbehaving with them. General Giap too laid emphasis on strict discipline. He expected the officers to be resolute and brave and be able to achieve perfect unity among the men. In the Oath of Honour the soldier was required to say: "The fighter must rigorously carry out the orders of his superiors and throw himself body and soul into the immediate and strict fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to him." Giap writes: "He who speaks of the army speaks of strict discipline." Shivaji was a strict disciplinarian himself. He did not tolerate ill-treatment of the people by his followers. He had one village headman beheaded when he received a complaint from a woman that he had molested her. His sense of justice and fair treatment became known not only amongst the people but also amongst the English and the Portuguese. In one of the reports dated 4 February 1660, sent by Henry Revington to the East India Company Headquarters at Surat he wrote that Shivaji was so considerate that he would not allow their men to be kept prisoners as they were not captured for any mis-behaviour on their part. A number of Shivaji's subjects were Muslims. He treated them with absolute justice because as a guerrilla leader he and his men could have been let down by the local Muslim population as well. On 13 August 1657 he had issued orders to all the Deshmukhs and revenue officials of Khedebare area that they would allow the Hindus and Muslims to continue tilling their lands as before. There is another evidence on record dated 18 December 1660



whereby he allowed the Muslims and Hindus of Pune, Indapur, Chakan, Supe and Baramati areas to continue with their land grants as in the days of the Muslim rulers.

### STRICT DISCIPLINE

The need to maintain strict discipline amongst the guerrillas and the stress on fair treatment given to the population by them arises from their dependence upon the people. The guerrillas are recruited voluntarily from amongst the people and unlike regular troops they do not depend upon any administrative machinery for joining their ranks. It is the ideological bond that binds them to the people and enables them to perform superhuman feats of heroism. In the initial stages of their struggle against the established order they are militarily weak and are unable to protect the population from the wrath of the rulers. In actual fact they become the cause for the additional sufferings of the people. The mere suspicion of their presence in a particular area is often enough for the rulers to take reprisals against all the people in that area. If the guerrillas are themselves not a disciplined body and tend to oppress the people because they possess a few odd arms, they are liable to lose popular support.

Popular motivation to rise in armed struggle has its roots in different types of aspirations of the people. They may be political—nationalism borne out of the desire for independence; economic due to poverty of the masses and concentration of wealth in the hands of a few; dissatisfaction in the ownership of land and its cultivation; and social and religious for wanting to assert as an entity. As soon as the guerrillas succeed in establishing their rule over some part of the land they take immediate steps to carry out land reforms, root out corruption and set about distributing wealth as far as it is practicable. Reforms cannot be enforced by law alone. They also need popular sanction. The guerrilla leader has to proceed cautiously in enforcing them. In the days of Shivaji it was customary to make land grants to the people for the services rendered by them. This system had an inherent advantage in it, in that the grantees were responsible for the collection of land revenue. They could also maintain a small armed force of their own so that they could be called up for service by the central authority as and when necessary. The ruler did not have to maintain a standing army and thus incur expenditure throughout the year. The obvious disadvantage was that such landlords were liable to disregard orders that did not suit them and often followed their own course. Shivaji was against making new land grants. There are instances on record when he gave such grants to a few men. For example, in 1650 he made two grants, one to Silimkar

Deshmukh of Gunjan Maval and another to Zunjarrao Maral Deshmukh who was given the village of Kondavale Budruk. In June 1674 he made a hereditary grant to Balaji Avaji Prabhu. But as far as possible he avoided making land grants. Had he cancelled all the existing grants he would have certainly set off a major social revolution. The new system would have required his appointing a large staff for revenue collection and a rich treasury to pay for their monthly wages. The zest of the communists for land reforms is too well known to need particular mention and elucidation.

Three essentials of guerrilla warfare have so far been discussed above. These are : popular support; existence of a *cause*; and need for strict discipline amongst the guerrillas. There is yet another important and essential requirement of the guerrilla warfare. It is that the guerrillas must have a suitable terrain to fight for their cause.

This terrain should be such as would enable the guerrillas to take refuge in inaccessible areas after they hit the enemy. Such areas can be found in the mountains and dense jungles. Shivaji chose the mountainous and jungle terrain of the Sahyadri range between the districts of Pune and Satara for his operations. The mountains here are not high in comparison with those of the Himalayas. The heights of the hill tops vary between two to five thousand feet; but the entire range consists of mountain sides with steep and precipitous slopes, narrow valleys, dense jungles and easy to defend passes. In his days there were a number of forts already built in the area and manned by Hindu as well as Muslim commanders. Shivaji took possession of these forts one by one, improved some of them and constructed a few new ones. This gave him a firm base to operate from. The rulers of Bijapur and Delhi were well aware of the cost of recapturing the forts. But this also placed Shivaji in a disadvantage in that he was operating in an area which had few local supplies and therefore lesser resources to maintain a large body of troops. The targets were usually a distance away in the more fertile and populated areas of the plains. The Greek guerrillas who formed a "Democratic Army" in mid-1949 found that the mountains were an asset of inestimable value to them. The whole of Greece is composed of mountains interspersed with small valleys. The range varies in width from forty to sixty miles and the maximum height is not more than 7,500 feet. These mountains channelise movement along a few routes going through the passes and the Democratic Army of the guerrillas could effectively control these passes with comparatively less forces. The communist guerrillas who fought in the jungles of Malaya in the mid-1950s found that the thick jungles gave them a number of hiding places which were extremely difficult for the regular forces to detect. If the army established small bases

from where to patrol the jungle to comb out the guerrillas such firm bases themselves became subject to attack by the guerrillas. The Pakistani guerrillas who entered India in August 1965 initially hid in the thick jungles in inaccessible places in the high mountain ranges of the Himalayas and escaped detection on a number of occasions despite a number of patrols trying to locate them. During this period the author once received information from a local Kashmiri that one such patrol was hiding in the jungles within five miles of his camp. He sent five patrols to locate this patrol. The patrols came back without having succeeded in their mission. Subsequently a guerrilla who was taken prisoner from this particular band admitted that one of our patrols had gone within a few feet of a deep ravine in the mountains where they were hiding and it was just their good luck that they had not been detected.

### NATURE OF TERRAIN

There is another requirement of terrain which should be borne in mind. The terrain should not only be difficult but it should be sufficiently large to enable the guerrillas to shift locations of their bases in the initial stages. A small and well developed country is not suitable for guerrilla operations. Good communication network can be effectively used by their enemies to locate them and then fight them. Although good roads also help the guerrillas to move from one place to the other with speed, they are liable to be themselves ambushed on such roads. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that government forces consider it below their dignity not to use the highways. According to them, they are required to keep these arteries of communications open and if they do not use them or avoid using them, how can they instil confidence in the local population? Even well trained troops prefer to move by main routes when they are available. It saves them time and considerable energy. Yet this advantage itself is what the guerrillas want to deny them. And they can do so best by ambushing the convoys or individual vehicles on the main communication system. If the country is sufficiently large and rugged, the guerrillas can easily hide themselves and escape detection. An effective way to search the countryside is by the troops moving simultaneously on the main roads as well as searching the hilltops and likely places of hiding on either side of these. This system is time-consuming and tiring. In the final analysis it is not very effective either. The ground was searched only a few hours back can be occupied by the guerrillas and used to destroy the vehicles moving on the tracks or roads. When the troops search the ground, they come across any number of innocent looking civilians who are either working in the fields or attending to some household chore in the huts. It is next to im-



possible to say whether they themselves are not guerrillas or their active agents. In Cyprus, Colonel Grivas who operated under the name Digenis and played havoc with the British troops, by making use of even small boys and girls to carry arms or information. Howsoever well trained a soldier may be he cannot distinguish between a law-abiding citizen and one who has the intention of breaking it. The soldier cannot fathom the mind of the people he comes across under such circumstances.

"Mountains eat up troops" is an old cliché. When the troops have to deal with the guerrillas, they find that they are never adequate for the role. They can always do with more. And when more troops are detailed, security tends to become lax and they become a source of supply of arms to the guerrillas. More troops means more movement of arms, ammunition and supplies on the main lines of communication. This affords more opportunities to the guerrillas to ambush them and add to their stock of captured arms and ammunition.

Lawrence worked out the requirement of Turkish troops to deal with his small bands of guerrillas arithmetically. He reckoned that the Turks would need to man a fortified post every four square miles in the desert, and each post would need at least 20 men. Thus they would need 600,000 men to deal effectively with him. He therefore argued that he was bound to succeed. Although such an argument does not work out in practice, there was considerable logic in what Lawrence said. Even the desert eats up troops although in modern times it has lost its old significance due to the development of aircraft, particularly helicopters.

#### COMMUNICATIONS

Undeveloped countryside, large mountains and sparse population have inherent disadvantages for the guerrillas as well. They find that centralised control of their operations becomes difficult due to lack of communications. The central leadership has to rely to a large extent on the initiative and prudence of the local people. But since the operations are mostly on small scale in the initial stages, it does not matter much if central direction is lacking so long as the guerrillas are disciplined and do not alienate the people. All the active guerrillas cannot till the land and have to depend upon the people to feed them. When the population is sparse, it is due mostly to lack of food and paucity of good cultivatable soil. The guerrillas find it quite difficult to obtain their food supplies from the locals. Government forces normally resort to grouping the villages and keeping them under close surveillance so that the guerrillas are denied their source of supplies of foodstuff.

Although it would appear that the guerrillas would find a lesser number of targets in hilly terrain, it is not so in actual practice. The security forces are drawn into the mountains with the sole aim of establishing law and order. When the first batch finds that it is hopelessly inadequate for the task, more and more troops and material are sent from the capital. As stated earlier, the mountains absorb any number of troops and soon the guerrillas find that they have far more number of targets than they could care to engage.

It is one of Napoleon's maxims that 'the whole secret of the art of war lies in making oneself master of the communications.' The government forces just cannot make themselves masters of communications in the mountains when faced with guerrillas.

Another essential requirement of the guerrilla war is the need to maintain continuous pressure against their enemies and display visible and successful action so that popular support is not only kept up but also increased. The guerrillas cannot afford to lose because of small numbers and lack of established organisation as is possessed by the existing government security forces. Defeat demoralises a small voluntary force more than it does properly trained troops. The guerrillas lose confidence in their leader quicker in case of his leading them to defeat than in the case of regular troops who can be explained the reasons of defeat. In any case they are taught the need and mode of withdrawal as an operation of war itself; not the guerrillas. If the guerrillas cannot stand defeat, it follows that they must attack when absolutely sure of success i.e., attack isolated posts in overwhelming numbers; surprise small patrols on the move; ambush convoys on roads, and generally harass the enemy whenever and wherever possible. In Cyprus, Dighenis resorted to murdering British nationals in the streets, in their offices and homes. He justified his actions with the following argument : "Such a change (murder) is, to say the least, naive, because to kill your opponent by assailing him at his weakest point, from the side or rear, is a tactic as old as Alexander the Great, Epaminondas and Marathon, and in more modern times was adopted during the wars of Frederick the Great and Napoleon. What would the critics say if a general were to make a frontal attack against a much stronger opponent, thereby leading his soldiers to a useless death? They would of course demand that he be court-martialled or at least cashiered. What would they say, on the other hand, if another general, by a skilful manoeuvre brought his troops to the opponent's rear and directed his men's fire at the enemy's back? Far from calling him a murderer, they would applaud him'.

## AFZAL KHAN'S DEATH

When Shivaji killed Afzal Khan on 10 November 1659 at the base of Pratapgad fort near Mahabaleshwar, he knew that the Khan had left Bijapur with a strong army with the avowed intention of bringing Shivaji dead or alive to Bijapur. There was no doubt in the mind of anyone about Afzal Khan's intention. It was well known not only to the troops accompanying the two warriors but the news had spread amongst the Moghals at Delhi and the British and the Portuguese traders as well. The over-confident Khan did not take elementary precautions to protect himself. He was so sure of his own physical prowess and his generalship that he convinced himself that Shivaji was frightened of him. When the two adversaries met, Afzal Khan tried to twist Shivaji's neck and in the scuffle that took place lost his life.

Just as a bank does not advance any loan without adequate security, the guerrillas do not attack unless they are certain of surprising the enemy. In the encounter between the incautious Afzal Khan and Shivaji, the entire army of the Khan was surprised in the narrow valley of the Koyna at the foot of the fort and was destroyed in a matter of few hours. Another brilliant example from the life of Shivaji is his raid on the residence of Shahiste Khan. With barely a handful of soldiers, Shivaji entered the house, very nearly killed the Khan himself, and then staged a neat escape. The Khan was so scared thereafter that he left Pune for good.

Mao Tse-tung writes : 'Seem to come from the east and attack from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow, attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws.... The enemy must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted, and annihilated.'

Continuous activity is kept up without losing sight of surprise, stratagem and ruse. The guerrillas cannot use the same method twice and hope to succeed. They must think of new methods to surprise the enemy and win small battles. The battles should not be long-lasting. They must be quick affairs where the guerrillas can bring into play their alertness, mobility and speed. Continuously harassing the enemy creates a sense of insecurity amongst the minds of his officials and they do not dare to move out without adequate protection against the guerrillas who may not exist in that part. This places a heavy strain on the troops which are required everywhere and by everyone of consequence. When the insecure feeling is pervading, even the lowest official feels that his duties require adequate protec-



tion. If the guerrillas are continuously active in many parts at the same time, then they will be able to make the enemy overstretch both physically and morally.

The guerrilla must always work for success. As stated earlier defeat is very harmful to his cause. People do not understand defeat. He must therefore aim to inflict maximum casualties on his enemy when he is certain of minimum loss to his own force. He lacks facilities for medical aid and his wounded might give away the location of the larger force and its intention. He has to depend upon the people to hide the wounded and look after them. The agonies suffered by such people become unbearable to those who watch them groan and yet cannot help them effectively. Civilian morale is likely to be affected by the stories of defeat and the casualties which are bound to circulate after each skirmish where the force has suffered unnecessarily heavy casualties. That is the primary reason why the guerrilla hits where and when least expected and resorts to deception. To the guerrilla the enemy's rear is his front.

#### FIRM BASE

Guerrillas cannot sustain themselves indefinitely on the sympathies of the people. A stage in their struggle comes when they have to fend for themselves. They can do so only by establishing a firm base inside the country which they can defend and call their own land. Guerrilla war by itself does not help to achieve the cause for which the guerrillas take up arms. This war has to culminate finally into regular conventional type war fought between regular forces. Initially the guerrilla-backed troops might depend upon the old tactics; but for final success and quick victory they have to take recourse to conventional way of fighting. The aim of the guerrilla leader is, therefore, to form a firm base as soon as possible from where he can operate with impunity. He can use the area of the base as a training ground for the new entrants and administer the countryside as if it were a free land. In the initial stages of establishing a firm base he has to take care that its approaches are well guarded, it is well defended and there are escape routes available in case an emergent necessity of quitting arises. As his hold strengthens, he can set about instituting land reforms, train the men for conventional fighting, collect arms and ammunition, food supplies and other ordnance necessities for the conduct of war. He can use this base for the manufacture of the much needed arms and ammunition.

Lawrence of Arabia depended upon a foreign base for his vital supplies. Mao established one as soon as possible. At one stage in 1934 he undertook a 6000-mile march from Kiangsi to the residual stronghold in

Shensi to escape encirclement and consequent annihilation by Chiang's forces. Soon thereafter he joined hands with Chiang Kai-shek to form a united front against Japan. In 1937, he held some 30,000 square miles and by 1945 about 300,000 square miles, never allowing his army to be drawn in conventional fighting against the Japanese. He followed guerrilla tactics to fight the Japanese and conserved the army for a final showdown with Chiang whom he expelled from the mainland by 1950 after a series of conventional battles from 1945 between his regular forces and those of Chiang's. Wherever the Chinese communists held control, Mao introduced land reforms and developed them throughout the war years till the final adoption of the Agrarian Reform Law in 1950. Thus he won sufficient rural political support for his cause, attracted a large number of recruits for his army, ensured supplies and secured positive cooperation particularly in the fields of intelligence and supply. Giap too strove for firming in North Vietnam as soon as it was possible. The Cypriots depended largely upon foreign supplies of sophisticated arms and manufactured the crude varieties locally. A firm base already existed for the Russian partisans in eastern Russia which had not been occupied by the Germans. Shivaji commenced ruling the territory around Pune at a very young age as an independent king. To ensure freedom of the area, he took possession of a number of forts beginning with Torna, Rajgad and Kondhana. He used the entire area as a firm base for furthering his aim. By 1658, he successfully ruled the Pune region, introduced land reforms and raised a sufficiently large force to take part in conventional type of fighting.

#### NO BANDIT

What distinguishes a guerrilla from a bandit is that he fights for a cause whilst a bandit commits theft and decoity for personal gain. It is the existence of the cause that brings in its wake popular support. The Government machinery initially resorts to the propaganda that the guerrilla is a mere bandit and out to kill for personal gain. But the people know the truth and back him. Mao formed the first Chinese communist army in 1928 with 1000 men. In May that year, Chu Teh joined him with 2000 more of his men. By the end of the year, 8000 armed peasants made common cause with him. By 1934, the Red Army had about 180,000 men under arms.

Guerrilla war is not new to military history although military historians gave scant attention to this type of irregular war. Clausewitz wrote his treatise when war became the concern of the entire state and armies had to be raised in hundreds of thousands. He did not give serious thought to

this irregular war which the ill-clad fights the well-clothed and where the ill-armed puts to shame the armed-to-the-teeth and well trained professional soldier. This war takes shape in the minds of the people and is then sustained by them according to their genius.

There are six basic requirements of this war. To summarise, these are : strong mass support; a worthwhile cause dear to the masses; strict discipline amongst the guerrillas; a large and rugged terrain to operate from; continuous and successful activity; and lastly the need to establish a firm base to continue the struggle by conventional means. This war places a heavy strain on the people who suffer the most at the hands of the government forces as well as often times the guerrillas themselves. It is certainly not an economic way to win the political objective. In this modern age where the threat of nuclear war looms large, political leaders think more in terms of achieving their aim by resorting to this type of war than by any other. They know quite well that it takes ten soldiers to fight one guerrilla. War has come to stay with mankind. It can be opposed effectively only by war. Man dare not use nuclear weapons; the super powers worry about escalation of conventional conflicts. The only war that must then go on is this sublimated and irregular war which needs more attention paid to it than before.

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# MAY BE TRIED OUT IN R&D

BRIGADIER NB GRANT. AVSM

NOT found fit for regimental duties, may be tried out in "R & D", thus read the ACR of an officer whose parent arm wanted to get rid of him. Although 25 years have passed since our Independence, and our armies have fought four major wars during this period, in many cases with weapons developed indigenously, the attitude of the Services towards R & D has not substantially changed. As far as the Services are concerned, R & D still remains a mysterious organisation to be associated with only from a distance, and which nevertheless must be tolerated as an avenue for Service officers recommended for ERE appointments.

The aim of this paper is to go into the reasons for this, and suggest an organisational concept which would intimately integrate the Services with R & D functions. For better understanding of the problem, a comparison has been made of our R & D with the concepts prevailing in other countries like the UK and USA.

The following are the fundamental differences between the Defence Development and Production Organisation of the USA and UK as compared to that existing in our country—

- (a) In the USA and UK, development and production is controlled by a single unified organisation at the technical working level. In our set-up, there are three completely separate departments for R & D, Production and Inspection, the coordination of which only takes place at the administrative level of the Secretary, Ministry of Defence Production.
- (b) Whereas in the USA and UK, the executive responsibility for R & D, Production and Inspection is vested in the Services concerned, in our organisation it is controlled by the Ministry of Defence Production.
- (c) In those countries, and specially in the USA, the heads of all Defence R & D establishments and laboratories, are Service officers. This is not so with our establishments and laboratories.

## UNIFIED RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION

### THE UK AND USA SYSTEM

Of all the differences mentioned above, the most important is the concept of unified responsibility for development and production. In the UK the responsibility for development, production, inspection and procurement has been vested with the MGO, while in the USA, the newly formed Army Materials Command has been made responsible not only for development, production, inspection and procurement, but even for supply and heavy maintenance.

A study of the development and production organisation in the UK will reveal, that although at the ministerial level there exists a civil Chief Scientific Adviser, who is the equivalent of the Scientific Adviser in our country, the executive control both of R & D and I & P rests with the respective Service Chiefs. In the Army this control is exercised through the MGO. It is also observed, that the unification of development and production takes place at the level of the Director in charge of the particular commodity.

In the US organisation, the Director of Research and Engineering, a civilian, is the Chief Scientific Adviser to the Secretary of Defence. Further control, at the executive level is, however, vested in the respective Service Chiefs as is the case in the UK. The Chief of R & D (CR & D), who is equivalent to the Chief Controller R & D (CCR & D) in our organisation, is a PSO and has Army Staff responsibility for planning, coordinating and supervising the Army's R & D and Test and Evaluation Programme. In this respect the CR & D's relationship with the Chief of Staff and the Army Staff corresponds to that of a Vice Chief of Army Staff.

### THE SYSTEM EXISTING IN OUR OWN ORGANISATION

Even from a cursory glance at our own organisation, it will be seen, that the system caters for three distinct and independent departments, ie R & D, Production and Inspection. It is also significant to note, that the coordination and unification, if it at all can be called that, of all these three specific departments takes place only at the level of the Secretary of Defence Production. There is no real effective coordination at any of the technical working levels, and it is felt, that this is one of the fundamental weaknesses of our system.

An equipment-oriented organisation can be based either functionally or commodity-wise. Any development and production set-up, however,

must contain elements of both. The important point is to decide the level at which it will function; this will depend on the task to be done at the level concerned. Experience of other countries has shown that the most effective level for this purpose is that of the Technical Director responsible for a particular commodity or groups of similar commodities.

Let us now examine each of the above mentioned Departments in some detail :—

(a) *Research and Development*

At the head of the R&D is the Scientific Adviser and Director-General Research and Development (SA and DGR&D). In this role he wears two hats. In the capacity of Scientific Adviser (SA) he answers directly to the Minister of Defence; however, as Director-General Research and Development (DGR&D) he comes under the Minister of Defence Production. Directly under him he has a Chief Controller Research and Development (CCR&D) who is responsible for equipment-oriented establishments, and the Chief Scientist (CS) who heads the basic research laboratories. At the Service level, the SA and DGR&D is represented by an officer designated as SA to COAS, SA to CNS etc; however, the Service Chiefs have no direct control over the R&D effort. The only control that the Service Chiefs exercise over the R&D programme, is by being represented on some of the R&D equipment panels. This, however, at best is only an indirect control, and cannot ensure that the entire R&D effort is being fully geared and directed towards Service requirements.

(b) *Inspection*

The Inspection Department is an admixture of an Inter-Service and One Service function. In this respect, while Air Force stores are inspected by the Air Force itself, and inspection of Naval stores (other than common user ancillaries) are done by the Navy, the inspection of Army stores is the responsibility of an Inter-Service Organisation.

(c) *Production*

There is no direct link at any of the technical working levels between Production and R&D. Besides, unlike the R&D and Inspection, wherein these departments are headed at least by technical officers, in the case of the Production Department, control



and coordination is effected mostly through non-technical secretarial staff.

It will at once be apparent, that the existing organisation would be difficult to coordinate, difficult to lead into a period of innovation, and difficult to get information into and out of. In this respect from the point of view of material development and production, amongst the deficiencies that result from fragmentation, the following inflict the severest penalty on its economical and efficient functioning :—

- (a) The system lacks uniformity, in that the user has to look to three or four separate agencies for the development and production of the same commodity.
- (b) The existing control mechanism tends to breakdown, and failure to coordinate fully the efforts of all such agencies results in the lack of unified direction and integration of development and production effort.
- (c) Different contractual procedures and procurement practices confuse industry, and tend to foment uneconomical practices.

#### A SUGGESTED NEW CONCEPT FOR OUR DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION ORGANISATION

To overcome the shortcomings mentioned above, a new organisational concept for development and production has to be evolved, based on the following principles :—

- (a) Development, Production and Inspection must be unified at the level of the Technical Commodity Director.
- (b) At the working level, the executive control of both R&D, Production and Inspection should be vested in the head of the Service concerned.
- (c) The CCR&D Army should be a PSO to the COAS, and must have Army Staff responsibility for planning and coordinating the Army's R&D and Production effort.

So long as the principles enumerated above are followed, various organisational combinations are possible; e.g., it would be quite in order for the COAS to exercise his command directly through the CCR&D, or even through an additional PSO designated for the purpose. The proposed new organisational concept will have the following main advantages :—

- (a) Total R&D effort will be diverted towards meeting Defence objectives.
- (b) An industrial firm that is developing or producing an article will have fewer departments to deal with. In the event the developing firm also produces the article, contacts with the Defence department will be through the same agency.
- (c) The contractual policies and procedures for development and production for each category of material will be more nearly uniform than before. The suggested new organisational concept will be better suited to coordinate complex systems which may have to be spread over several technical areas.
- (d) The development and procurement of any weapon system will be accomplished by a single agency, with a single project manager for each major system.

## COMMAND AND CONTROL

### EXECUTIVE CONTROL OF DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION

Apart from the concept of unified control, another major difference between our Development and Production organisation and those of the UK and USA, is in the command and control set-up. It is true that both in the UK and USA as well as with us, a civilian scientist is the top adviser for all R&D matters at the ministerial level. This is how it should be. However, whereas in the former countries the executive control of Development and Production vests with the respective Service Chiefs, in our country this remains the direct function of the Minister of Defence Production. One of the possible reasons why this arrangement was adopted for our organisation may have been, that as R&D was still in its infancy, and had not yet been 'sold' to the Services, it was considered essential to place it directly under the Ministry, so as to help nurture it to maturity in the shortest possible time. That stage has now passed, and it is for consideration whether, a time has now come for R&D and Production to revert to their proper place under the executive control of the Services which they serve. It is felt that the only way for the Services to get genuinely interested and give full support to R&D, would be to place it under their direct executive control at the proper technical working level. The top advisory function at the ministerial level must, however, continue to remain with the civilian Scientific Adviser, whose status should be equated to that of the Service Chiefs or even higher.

## CONTROL OF ESTABLISHMENTS/LABORATORIES

In the US Armed Forces, although the Director of Research and Engineering is the Chief Scientific Adviser to the Secretary of Defence, and is a civilian officer, the heads of most R&D establishments and laboratories are Service officers. Within individual establishments, however, the heads of the various departments may be either Service officers or civilian scientists. In this respect it is significant to note that the majority of the civilian scientists working in Defence R&D Establishments in the USA and UK, have either seen active service, or have undergone military training sometime during their career. Hence all these civilian scientists speak, so to say, the Service language, and are quite conversant with the various Defence problems—a state of affairs which does not exist in our organisation. In those countries, the heads of the establishments being Service officers not only ensures that the Service aspect in all development work is kept in focus at all times, but also ensures that all research work is properly channelled and completely oriented towards Defence needs. In other words, there is no room for any research which has not a distinct Service or Defence bias. If this is the system adopted in a country, where, as pointed out before, most of the civilian scientists have already seen some sort of military service, it is for consideration whether, in our country, where the only time the civilian scientists come to know the difference between a gun and a rifle is when they join the R&D organisation, some such system as existing in the American Army should also be adopted for our own R&D establishments and laboratories.

It must be understood, however, that the Service Director of an establishment or laboratory must only function as a coordinator to ensure, that the scientific effort of his organisation is kept on the right track at all times. It should also be quite in order for the civilian scientist of the establishment to draw pay even two to three times higher than that of the Director. In this respect, the pay of the scientist must be regulated to the nature and quality of the scientific work, and should not be related to any rank structure. In this connection it is also accepted, that the social status of the civilian scientist in an establishment may be equal to or even higher than the Director of that establishment. In other words, the civilian scientist is important or otherwise in his own rights; the Service Director is there only for coordination and ensuring that the scientific work of the establishment is aimed correctly to Defence needs at all times.

## PERMANENT SECONDMENT OF SERVICE OFFICERS TO THE R&amp;D

There appears to be some confused thinking regarding the tenure of



Service officers serving with the R&D. When we started R&D, the policy was, that Service officers would go to R&D on a tenure basis, and would then revert to regimental duties, and at a later stage may again go to R&D for another tenure, and so on. It was then felt, and quite rightly too, that if the Service officer had to bring user knowledge to R&D, he can only do so, provided he is periodically rotated round with regimental duties. Based on this policy, certain appointments e.g. the Director, the Deputy Director and also heads of certain other faculties, were made tenable by Service officers only, irrespective of their inter se seniority with civilians in the organisation. This is the practice which is followed in the UK and America, and as far as we know even in the communist countries, and this appears to be the correct system, if R&D has got to remain 100 percent user-oriented.

During the last few years, however, we seem to have digressed from the above policy, and have now started seconding Service officers permanently to the R&D. The disadvantages of such a system are enumerated below—

- (a) After staying in R&D for any length of time, say over three to four years, the Service officer loses touch with the realities of his arms requirements, and tends to become theoretical, and is not in a position to use his Service knowledge for the development of military hardware. In this respect, after a certain number of years in R&D, there can be no difference between a Service officer and his civilian counterpart. Thus the fundamental aim why Service officers are sent to R&D is defeated.
- (b) It has been noticed, that the Service officer permanently seconded to R&D has very little allegiance or loyalty to his parent arm. This is to be expected. This being the case, the parent arm has also very little loyalty towards the officer concerned. This therefore does not lend itself to the intimate cooperation which should exist between R&D and the Service which it is supporting.
- (c) If the officers of a particular arm are to be seconded permanently to R&D, it is only human nature, that the Service concerned will not give its best officers to C&D. If on the other hand, the Service officer goes to R&D only on a tenure basis, the arm concerned will make quite sure that it gives its best officers for the purpose, as it knows, that they will have to return to it after the R&D tenure is completed. Under the present system, the Service concerned loses confidence in R&D, and the latter in turn, cannot deliver the goods, as basically it is not staffed with the cream of the arm concerned, and only has to 'make-do' with left-overs.
- (d) If Service officers are to be permanently seconded to R&D, a

time will come when we will not be able to keep certain posts reserved for them, as, when the civilian officers in that organisation reach a certain seniority, they will automatically claim these appointments.

In view of the above, it is for consideration, whether we should not change the existing policy of permanently seconding Service officers to R&D and adopt the system existing in other countries, where the Service officer after doing one or more tenures in R&D, periodically keeps on coming back to his parent arm to do a tenure of regimental duty.

### CONCLUSION

If the Defence R&D is to achieve its objective, namely to develop and produce equipment in which the Services will have confidence, it is essential, that the R&D functions are intimately integrated with the Service organisation. This can best be done if the Development and Production departments are reorganised on the following basic principles :—

- (a) Development, Inspection and Production should be unified at the level of the Technical Commodity Director.
- (b) At the working level, the executive control of both R&D Production and Inspection should be vested in the head of the Service concerned.
- (c) The Directors of equipment-oriented establishments and applied research laboratories must always be Service officers.

Finally in Defence R & D, there must exist a strong feeling for the requirement of the military-civilian team concept, not only for operations, but also for management. In this respect, the bulk of continuity as well as the bulk of technical competency must come from the civilian scientist. One pertinent factor, however, cannot be emphasised too strongly, in that, continuity lies only too often in the realm of the military, i.e. the pride of mission and accomplishment, coupled with the acceptance of organisational and national responsibility. The Service officer is a life-long public servant, whose major reward is pride of accomplishment with little hope for material or financial gain or total personal security for himself or for his family. Above all, he is permanent, he is solid, and his integrity of purpose is above reproach. A civilian counterpart on the other hand, only too frequently approaches his job in a functional or area manner. He considers himself a slave to the method of accomplishment rather than accomplishment of the mission itself. Only too frequently he also succumbs to a more lucrative, or to him a more interesting assignment, or one which will advance his or his family's personal objectives. This he does for sound reasons, and reasons that are also covered by integrity of purpose. It is nevertheless true, that but for the solid framework of the life-time professional career soldier, our organisation would be in a shambles without help of mission accomplishment.

Let us hope, that in future we will see ACRs which will read as follows :—

'Has not got the necessary intelligence and imagination for R & D; may be tried out in a regiment of the line.'

# THE PATERNALISTIC SOCIETY OF THE ARMY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

LIEUT COLONEL YA MANDE

HUMAN values and social concepts change from time to time. This in turn affects the relationship between rulers and subjects, leaders and the masses, and managers and workers. Intellectual revolution always precedes social revolution and it is the ability of the society to overcome change resistance which distinguishes between evolution and revolution. At present, democracy is the order of the day. Decisions are made by majority vote. Collective bargaining and trade unionism are the basis of the relationship between the managers and workers. The armed forces alone maintain an organisation which is highly paternalistic and authoritarian.

One cannot think of an army without authority and paternalism. At the same time social and political conditions in the society around us are entirely different. Members of the armed forces are bound to be influenced by the society. The contradictory environments therefore pose many problems.

In my article "Commanding officer and his team" USI Journal, September 1972) I had analysed the problems involved in officer management. The present article deals with man-management and seeks to discuss the paternalistic society of the army.

**T**HE word paternalism is derived from 'pater' (father). In a patriarchal society the term, signifies the absolute authority of the father. By usage and in a broader sense, it also means the absolute authority of the head of the family, clan, tribe or king. This type of structure of authority in a society is of ancient origin and its traces are visible even today in some of the joint families and certain societies.

The organization of the army is highly paternalistic. The officer commanding exercises the role of a pater, and as such he is concerned with all activities of his subordinates—not necessarily official. One may not even marry or call one's family to join one without his consent. He may dictate social relations and off-office movements. (While reading this article, readers may conveniently substitute the term Pater with officers commanding and formation commanders.)



From the medieval age and onwards, there has been a constant cry against concentration of power in one man. While considering transition from monarchy to democracy, one always remembers the three prominent political philosophers—Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau.

Hobbes (1588-1679) in his essay 'Of Commonwealth' considers that sovereign power is derived because of mutual consent of a great multitude. John Locke (1632-1704) is commonly accepted as the first advocate of modern concepts of civil liberties. In his essay "On civil government" he challenges the very basis of paternal power. He says that the power of parents arises from their duty and lasts no farther than the minority of children. Jean Jacques Rousseau, fiery and impulsive, is best known for his book, "The Social Contract." In "The Social Contract" he maintains that all powers of government must rest upon the consent of the governed.

My object of quoting Hobbes, Lockes and Rousseau is to show how political and social concepts have progressively changed from one-man rule and paternalism. Also, there is and will always be an inter-relation between political and social concepts.

Today we accept democracy and trade unions, majority votes and collective bargaining. Obviously, the social and political conditions affect the man in the armed forces. The impact is discernible in day-to-day life and we call it 'indiscipline.' This state of affairs amongst troops hardly requires any elaboration, but what about officers? The officer class, apart from their own discipline, appears to be increasingly becoming conscious of troubles which can be created by men. There is unnecessary talk about hazards of command and regimental life. In dealing with men, people seem to advocate caution, tact, leniency and welfare.

Is paternalism bad? Yes. It has many flaws. One merely needs to recall the disadvantages of a joint family. Paternalism suppresses growth of personality, initiative and the spirit of adventure. It breeds a sense of irresponsibility. It gives a false and unmanly sense of security.

Can we do away with paternalism in the armed forces and introduce trade unions? Obviously no. One, therefore, has to accept a highly paternalistic society of the army within the democratic society. And herein lies the fundamental contradiction and anomaly. Let us take an example. A commanding officer while addressing his men says "well boys, I have decided to do the following.....from tomorrow onwards you will....." Such a talk in the paternalistic society of the army is fully understandable. It speaks of confidence, conviction and in short, soldierly qualities of the

officers. But in civil life, it is different and one may ask many valid questions, for example, who gave you the authority to decide? Who are you to dictate our lives? In any case who gave you permission to call us boys?

Conditions in our army are good compared to most of the developed democratic countries. This is because of our heritage. We are used to joint families—a form of paternalistic society. We have respect for our elders. But these conditions are changing and are likely to change at a very rapid rate. We have therefore, to think of ways by which we can maintain this paternalistic society happy and efficient.

### THE BASIS

What is the basis of paternalism? It is love, affection and fellow feeling. Without this bond, a paternalistic society possibly cannot exist.

Love, affection and fellow feeling are precisely what is lacking in the outside world. It does not exist in trade unions and politics. John Ruskin's "Unto the Last" is an interesting study. He was pained to note exploitation and disharmony in industrial relations. He advocated the bond of love and affection between the managers and workers on the model of the army.

Strangely enough when a politician develops this bond of love and affection, he also becomes a pater and obvious examples are Gandhi and Nehru.

Because of love and affection, a pater develops indifference for his own self. He detaches himself from the materialistic world and devotes all his energy for the group. This is where lies the importance of what Lord Chetwood had said regarding the country, the men you serve and yourself.

And once again because of love and affection, leaders develop complete identity with their men. While reading French poetry, I was immensely influenced by Herbert Read's poem "My Company", It reads :—

You became  
In many acts and quiet observances  
A body and a soul entire.

The above lines are spoken by a company commander in war about his men. I have not come across a better example of identity and ownership.

The basis of paternalistic society, therefore, is—

"Love, affection and fellow-feeling

Detachment and devotion to group

Complete identity with the group and ownership"

But it has to be realised that the world is moving away from paternalism. Gandhi and Ruskin are impracticable and their teachings are only of academic interest. This trend is noticeable even in a traditionally most paternalistic society like Japan's. And what about our own army? Do we show indifference to our personal interests? Do we completely identify ourselves with the group? Are we, really devoted? Do we have lasting ownership of the group or does it disappear once we leave the command? I leave these questions without comment.

The paternalistic society has many implications. It is important to understand them as they enable better understanding of the organisation.

The first and foremost implication is utter lack of a sense of responsibility on the part of subordinates. The pater, therefore, has to be a dynamic figure who finds work for all and drives them to do it. I have heard many officers crib about their subordinates. There is nothing special or peculiar about it. It happens in joint families and it will happen in the army because this is a characteristic of paternalistic society. If you leave things to men they will do nothing. A leader, therefore, has to think of each and every detail and harness men to do it. At times, this sense of irresponsibility is very annoying but one has to understand this aspect and learn to remain calm. Carry out any investigation or inquiry, the end is always the same i.e. "thereafter, I reported the matter to Havildar Major/JCO/Officer or Officer Commanding". It appears funny, but there it is, all responsibilities end at the next superior officer.

Another implication of paternalistic society is redress of grievance. In paternalistic societies, subordinates don't like to voice their grievances unless it is a must. The old vernacular saying "Never go behind the horse and in front of the officer" has lots of meaning. A pater, therefore, has to find ways to discover grievances.

In any society grievances will always be there. It is better to voice grievances the moment they occur. Pent-up grievances burst out at a later date causing much alarm and disturbance. In a paternalistic society eruption and explosion of grievances must be prevented at all costs. In the army there are never strikes, but there are instances of collective insubordination and mutiny.

In a paternalistic society, it is not desirable to permit free voicing of grievances, for then there will be no end. And, therefore, it is essential to know the hush-hush affairs, "langer gaps" and the undercurrents in a unit so that timely measures are taken to prevent escalation.



I recall an incident in my last unit. Once for a fortnight my subedar major was daily reporting "all correct". On the fifteenth day I told the subedar major; "Sahab, you better check up details. It is impossible that in a unit of a thousand bodies nothing abnormal happens for a fortnight". I tapped other sources and sure enough there was some trouble in one of the company langars. It turned out to be a very minor trouble but what was important was timely detection and redress.

### SECURITY

Security is another implication of a paternalistic society. As a matter of fact, it is the strong point of a paternalistic society. A pater must learn to carry his group—good and bad, strong and weak, intelligent and dull. The situation is the same as in a clan, tribe or in a joint family. One cannot follow the policy of 'hire and fire' as happens in industries. In a paternalistic society, all members are acceptable provided their actions are not injurious to the group. Thus a pater has to find jobs for subordinates according to their qualities.

Pater is obviously the most important person in a paternalistic society. Every thing revolves around him. It is extremely difficult to write job specifications for a pater. He has additional unwritten responsibilities peculiar to the nature of the society. And look at this code; he accepts all responsibilities for all actions of his subordinates. Like in politics or industries, he cannot ascribe the blame to others, and particularly subordinates.

Concentration of power in paters is an inherent aspect of paternalistic societies. They combine all the powers of legislation, execution and judiciary. Subordinates have hardly any say. In all disputes and as a matter of rule paters are always upheld. Communication follows very rigid channels. The views of subordinates are generally not ascertained and a reference to people is never made. These aspects may appear very coveted and lucrative from the pater's point of view but progress in such a society is very difficult unless the paters are very learned, efficient and understanding. A very high standard, is, therefore, expected from paters.

Unless and until we get good officer material and train them well, the army cannot be good or efficient. The ways of getting good officer material is not within the scope of this discussion but what one needs is better facilities, conditions of service and compatible pay and allowances. At present, we are expecting too much for too little. All I want to emphasize is that the job requirements of officers in the armed forces is more difficult than anywhere else because of the characteristics of paternalistic society.

One often hears that jobs in civil service and industries are more exacting. Is it really so ?

In a paternalistic society, the group owes its loyalty and affection to a person and not to the office or appointment. The tenure of officers commanding and key officers in a unit therefore, requires consideration. It takes time for a pater and subordinates to get to know each other. Frequent changes confuse the group and ruin even a good unit. This trouble is accentuated in units where turn-over of men is carried out. Such units find it difficult to develop group spirit and cohesion. Paternalism is forced upon them. Similar trouble occurs in frequent grouping and regrouping of units in operations. To make things worse, there is a tendency even to group and regroup sub-units.

It is advisable to explain the nature of a paternalistic society to the subordinates. This can be done both during formal and informal conversations. Sainik Sammelans are ideal for communication of such ideas. This has become important due to the political atmosphere, trade-union activities and the growing unrest in the country. The army has its own code and one must get used to it. It is not at all possible to do away with paternalism in the army. It is true that men have lost many of the privileges but the paternalistic society has advantages of its own. The relation between officers and men does not merely concern work as in the case of managers and workers; it is something more. The bond of love, affection and fellow feeling is the essential feature of our life. We have maximum security because everyone has a place in a unit provided his actions are not injurious to the group. We lead the life of a good and happy family. The pater has a sense of ownership and the group a sense of belonging.

### DEVOTION

A pater is distinguished by a sense of devotion to the group. His pleasure is the well-being of the group. He has no privileges. He cannot afford to be a "Galoot", a term applied to those who want to take every thing from others and give nothing. To become good paters, officers have to imbibe a spirit of devotion. It is a different thing that the group looks after the pater. Normally in a good unit this will happen because of the bond of love and affection. There is, however, a difference between asking and getting.

In theory there ought to be no restrictions on the powers of a pater and he ought to be supreme in every sense. In practice absolute paternalism is not possible. Paternalism has lost its case not because of the people but

because of the follies of paters. The more one grows in position and status the more of humility and understanding one needs to develop.

Too much of welfare must not be a basis of smooth functioning of a paternalistic society. It amounts to bribing and appeasing men for some of the things they have lost in the paternalistic society. Overemphasis on welfare is a very short-term gain. It cannot stand the strains of crisis. The corporate aim of the army is training, discipline and physical fitness. The welfare activities are purely the benefits of organised life which spare more time for training and work.

Welfare and extra-curricular activities have yet another aspect as applied to our organisation. If a pater wants to develop a dairy farm, a dramatic society or a sports team, he can do it easily. There is very little to prevent the wishes of the pater from fulfilment. But all these are done at the cost of the corporate goal which in our case is preparedness for war. Fitness for war demands training, discipline and physical toughness. Therefore, only those welfare and extra-curricular activities should be considered which promote the corporate goal either directly or indirectly. Unfortunately, we in the army do not have adequate means to check performance level and attainment of the corporate goal and therefore deviation from the aim is easily possible.

### CONCLUSION

The paternalistic society of the army is out of tune with the surrounding world. It is an inherent part of army life. We have to take adequate steps to ensure that life in the armed forces does not suffer because of external pressures. It is advisable to explain the nature of paternalistic society to subordinates.

Paternalism breeds a sense of irresponsibility among subordinates. Grievances do not come to light easily and therefore one has to devise ways for early detection and redress. Security is the strong point of paternalistic society.

Paters occupy pivotal position in a paternalistic society. The additional responsibilities which fall upon officers due to the nature of paternalistic society has no parallel outside. If paters are bad the whole organisation will crumble. Selection, training and living conditions of officers requires careful consideration.

A paternalistic society exists on the basis of love, affection and fellow feeling. Because of love and affection, paters develop the spirit of devotion, identity and ownership.

Paters have to maintain a very high code and ensure that the corporate goal does not suffer.



# CURZON'S POLICY ON THE N.W. FRONTIER—A MILITARY STUDY

DR. K.M.L. SAXENA, M.A., PH.D.

THE Treaty of Berlin (1878) was regarded, with truth, as a triumph for England, and as a defeat for Russia. Lord Beaconsfield, who bore back with him from Berlin, 'peace with honour', was hailed for a striking diplomatic triumph. But in the perspective of history it was a victory won in a hopeless cause. It is true that after the Treaty of Berlin, Russia did not recover her influence in Turkey. But British diplomacy had at the same time led Russia, though unwittingly, to transfer her attention from the Near to the Far East. Russian efforts to gain influence in Kabul almost led to war with the British in September 1878. The conquest of Turkestan followed in 1881. England was truly alarmed when in February 1884 Merv submitted to the Tsar's rule. The occupation of Panjdeh by Russia in March 1885 once more brought England and Russia to the verge of war. The incident was happily settled, but the fear of an invasion of India by Russia continued to agitate British administration in India.

So far no organized plan had been evolved for the mobilization of the army. No definite proportion of troops had been laid down for the internal and external needs of the country, if a military confrontation should actually take place with Russia. Dufferin's Government, therefore, set up a Mobilization Committee in 1886. It prepared a scheme for the mobilization of two army corps and a reserve division. This scheme envisaged the supply of 700 officers and 13,000 men from England. But Her Majesty's Government desired that the preparation and organization of a field force "should depend on the materials at hand, leaving all considerations of what might be required hereafter to those imperial conditions which cannot be foretold, and which must be met when they arise by the action of Her Majesty's Government working in the general interests of the Empire".<sup>1</sup> The alternative scheme provided, after due provision of the obligatory garrisons, for the formation of four "divisions of all arms", additional cavalry brigades and brigades of line of communication to be placed in the field, without any assistance from England. These "divisions of all arms" were to be

<sup>1</sup> Military Despatch to India, No. 119, 17 May 1888.

drawn, as far as the distribution of the army admitted, from particular localities.<sup>2</sup>

### MOBILISATION SCHEME

The basis of this plan was mobilisation by stations, that is, certain stations were detailed from which the troops were to be withdrawn to form the field army. The mobilisation scheme also took into consideration the question of obligatory garrisons to be left behind to secure the internal peace of the country.<sup>3</sup>

Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief in India, was of the opinion that Russia would advance upon India either through Kandahar or the Khyber Pass, via Kabul. As a countervailing move against a possible Russian advance via Kabul, it became necessary to fortify Multan and Rawalpindi.<sup>4</sup> Entrenched positions were also prepared in Attock. Towards the south, on the north-west frontier, a very strong position, considered to be impregnable, was erected at Quetta<sup>5</sup> though no great force was massed there lest it should give the Amir a motive for concentrating his forces on the Kandahar border and result in a collision.<sup>6</sup> The fear that Russia would come down to Bozai Gombuz led to the occupation of Gor, Chilas and to interference with Chitral—"a terrible operation—an operation comparable to the Circassian war."<sup>7</sup> The forward move on the north-west frontier resulted in the multiplication of small posts garrisoned by detachments. In 1893, for example, there were three detachments between Astor and Ramgarh, and eighty posts between Gilgit and Hunza.<sup>8</sup>

After the signing of the Durand Convention settling the Afghan boundary with India, the Government of India further moved its frontier forces from posts like Dera Ismail Khan to posts on the new boundary. One such post was established at Spin in order to make the military position in the Gomal effective. The place was selected for two main reasons: (1) it was reputed to be healthy; and (2) while lying behind the Waziri country, it might almost be alleged to be outside it.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Military Despatch from India, No. 177, 30 June 1891.

<sup>3</sup> Military Dept. Proceedings, A. Jan. 1893, 155-86 and 187-88.

<sup>4</sup> Dufferin to Cross, 24 Aug. 1888, *Dufferin Papers*, Reel 518, Lr. 39.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Salisbury to Lytton, 9 Nov. 1877, *Salisbury Papers*, Reel 822.

Salisbury to Lytton, 15 Nov. 1877.

<sup>7</sup> Stephen to Lytton, 3 Oct. 1878, *Stephen P.*, Reel 1.

<sup>8</sup> Sir George White to Lansdowne, 20 May 1893, *Lansdowne P.*, Reel 11, Lr. 551.

<sup>9</sup> Elgin to Lockhart, 6 Feb. 1895, *Lansdowne P.*, Reel 12, Lr. 55.

The authorities in charge of Indian affairs, both in India and the U.K., were determined to do everything "short of bankruptcy" to keep fully prepared to meet the Russian attack if and when it materialized.<sup>10</sup> The lessons of the South African War were invoked and the necessity of making preparations in time of peace were emphasized. It was therefore necessary, more than anything else, to have an adequate number of men posted on the frontier in the most favourable positions. The military policy until Curzon's arrival in India as Viceroy continued to lie in the construction of more and more new cantonments and defensive works.

### CURZON'S POLICY

But Curzon's policy differed. He wrote to Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India, that a great deal of past misunderstanding of the military policy to be pursued on the north-west frontier of India had been due to "labels being used and attached to different schools of thought long after they had lost their sense or significance."<sup>11</sup>

In this context it must be noted that military policy on the north-west frontier had varied between the extremes of Lord Lawrence's "obstinate refusal to go forward and Lord Robert's rash wholesale schemes of annexation." Lawrence had expounded his views thus in 1864: "It has been too often the practice in India to be looking beyond our borders, and to be making preparation for imaginary dangers, while we neglect the affairs of our Provinces. Do not let us repeat these mistakes.... If we only take care to manage well at home, we can afford to let our neighbours alone. They will not molest us; and should they do so, they will live to repent such interference. I am fully aware that to be respected abroad we must be strong within British territory, but much strength also lies in the prosperity and contentment of the people, which again depends on good government and light taxation."<sup>12</sup>

As against this policy and that of Roberts "rash wholesale schemes of annexation", Curzon chose the middle course. He advocated the policy of military concentration inside the Indian borders and tribal conciliation outside.

Curzon personally visited the frontier to see things for himself, and came to the conclusion that much of the effort made was misdirected and not really worthwhile. What he saw there compelled him to adopt "an

<sup>10</sup> Godley to Curzon; 11 Jan. 1901, *Curzon P.*, Reel 2, Lr. 5.

<sup>11</sup> Hamilton to Curzon, 18 Apr. 1901, *Hamilton P.*, Reel 3, Lr. 15.

<sup>12</sup> Minute dated 26 July 1864, by Sir John Lawrence, M.D. Progs, Aug. 1864, No. 120.



attitude of vigilant and suspicious criticism". He found that all the "wonderful forts, with steel shutters and machicoulis galleries, and impregnable keeps," and the proposals for new cantonments etc. which "the pundits and pedants of the headquarter offices" were thrusting upon him, were useless<sup>13</sup>. He condemned the forward policy which had landed the British in Wana and Tochi, as it was a "hideous mistake" to have gone there. Militarily, it was an unsound policy because of the difficulty of supplies. He decided against the establishment of new posts, and, instead, initiated a scheme of frontier militias. The scheme initially provided for the enrolment of two battalions, of 800 each. The levies so formed were stationed at Kurram and Samana. Regular troops were consequently withdrawn from these places, as also from the Khyber, Tochi, and the Gomal and Shahpur valleys. All these places were now garrisoned by militia or border levies or the military police recruited from the frontier tribes. The troops thus withdrawn were concentrated in the neighbouring cantonments.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Curzon to Hamilton, 23 Apr. 1900, *Curzon P.*, Reel 2, Lr. 24.

<sup>14</sup> Hamilton to Curzon, 21 Feb. 1901, *Hamilton P.*, Reel 10, Lr. 14.

# OIL—BRITISH EXPERIENCES IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

A REVIEW ARTICLE

COMMODORE VEC BARBOZA, AVSM AND BAR

SINCE the end of the Second World War, H.M. Stationery Office has been publishing a number of volumes of official war history, military and civil. The last volume of the Civil Series is entitled "Oil - A Study of War Time Policy and Administration". Its author, Mr. D.J. Payton-Smith, carried out his studies as a spare-time task. This, and the fact that the subject has wide ramifications—political, economic and administrative, involving several agencies in many countries—probably explains the long time it has taken to publish this work.

Britain formulated an oil policy in the early years of this century. It was to ensure that oil found in the Empire would not fall into the hands of foreign companies and that sources of supply outside the Empire would remain available to her in time of war. Since oil resources within the Empire were not significant, the "closed door" policy turned out to be rather invidious. It inhibited would-be developers and encouraged reprisals against British companies outside the Empire. However, the policy of seeking to secure financial and administrative control of foreign oil supplies was more successful, though it inevitably depended on the quality of Britain's relationships with the oil producing countries.

Since Britain's indigenous oil resources were negligible, but she had abundant coal, research on "oil from coal" plants was undertaken in the inter-war years. It was hoped that this would reduce vulnerability in war, besides relieving the chronic distress which the coal industry was facing at the time. A committee appointed to study the project considered it technically feasible but uneconomic and of doubtful value in war. It strongly favoured reliance on petroleum imports. As it happened, however, coal (producer) gas was used for motor vehicles in Britain and other Commonwealth countries from 1942 onwards, though the benefits from this measure were not substantial.

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\*Oil: A study of war time policy and administration, by D.J. Payton-Smith. Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1971, pp 520 price £6.75.

The Committee of Imperial Defence had, among its standing Sub-Committees, an Oil Fuel Board, set up in 1925 on the advice of the Principal Supply Officers of the three Services. This Board, which soon widened the scope of its work to include lubricants and all other aspects of the oil economy, comprised members from various Ministries and Departments of the Government, including the Treasury, the Board of Trade and the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. "The special and traditional interest of the Admiralty was acknowledged by appointing its Civil Lord as Chairman". It was clear that the Oil Board would not only play a part in pre-war planning but in war-time administration as well. Shortly after the outbreak of war, an Oil Control Board was formed as a Sub-Committee of the War Cabinet, with civil and Service members. The Chairman was a civilian.

It was acknowledged that the Government would have to control the war-time activities of British oil and tanker companies, who were, therefore, invited to draw up their war administrative plans and to concert them through the creation of a central body which would liaise with the Government. This body was the Petroleum Board, whose, Chairman, nominated by the Government, was drawn from the oil trade.

Planning was to cater for a war against Germany (which would be confined to Europe), or a war in the Far East against Japan, or a war against both these countries. It had to cover a number of vital activities such as the securing of oil resources and their development, world-wide stocking policy, the machinery for administrative control of supplies and consumption, shipping requirements, the development of port facilities, internal transportation and distribution, measures for defence of installations against hostile air attack and the concerting of plans with those of likely allies. Several Sub-Committees were formed to serve the Oil Board, most of them inter-departmental.

The target year for the expected war was fixed at 1940 and it was estimated that the Armed Forces requirement of oil in the first year of war against Germany and Japan would be equivalent to the total consumption in the UK in 1938. It was obvious that civilian consumption in war would have to be curtailed and a detailed account is given of the debates and discussions, the thought and afterthought that went into devising a system of rationing and other measures to achieve this aim.

Several measures were recommended for the acquisition of tanker tonnage, the development of port facilities, the distribution of reserves, the



improvements in internal transportation etc. All these are explained in detail but the narrative is shot through with observations on the lack of a sense of urgency in implementing the various plans. Years elapsed between the initiation and final approval of various measures and long delays occurred between the sanction and start of projects. The Munich crisis of 1938 did act as a spur but, even so, when war broke out in 1939, very little of what was planned had appeared on the ground and several schemes were still being bandied about by various Government departments.

The need for collaborating with the French to correlate oil policies and plans was acknowledged, but influential opinion in Britain was against any formal approach which could give rise to German fears of "Encirclement". A few informal meetings with the French were held and views were exchanged more cursorily than with the sense of common purpose that such relationships need. The fact was that Britain, with her wide control of oil resources and tanker tonnage, considered herself far better off than France. The French realised their dependence on Britain but resented it.

There are some interesting notes on defensive measures for oil installations against air attack. The British believed that burying the whole strategic reserve underground would cost too much in manpower and resources and take a long time. Some of it, in very vulnerable areas, would have to be underground; the rest was to be protected in other ways or sited in areas of least danger. The Admiralty had plans for underground storage in ports. The Air Ministry found it convenient to distribute its holdings over a number of depots and to bury the tanks 10 feet in the ground, encased in concrete and covered with a layer of earth and concrete. Camouflage devices were also employed. The risk of fire spreading from tank to tank was to be minimised by "sterilising" some of the tanks in existing installations - that is, by emptying them and transferring their contents to new underground storage. Later, these empty tanks were used as water reservoirs. The oil companies were advised to resort to bunding to hold back oil escaping from damaged tanks to the rest of the installation and, as far as possible, to build "protected" storage in vulnerable areas. The Government agreed to bear half the cost of such work.

How effective did these measures prove to be? The effectiveness of camouflage was found to be limited by the highly distinctive shadows cast by oil storage tanks. The "protected" storage programme was far from complete when war came and indeed much of it was completed after the worst phase of the air bombing was over. Fortunately, the loss or damage inflicted on oil stocks from air attack was much less than

anticipated and "had no significant effect on the general oil position". According to the study, "the main reason why losses were not more serious was that bombing from aircraft proved surprisingly ineffective as a method of destruction". The stage of development of air bombing was such that accuracy and destructive power were not so devastating. For example, an oil installation of modern design, with well spaced tanks etc., was hit by thirtynine high explosive bombs in one raid without damage to any vital part. Most of the damage caused by bombs did not come from direct hits but from near misses. Again, it was the ancilliary fittings such as pipelines which were more vulnerable to blast and splinters than the tanks themselves. Oddly enough, incendiary bombs proved less effective against oil tanks than high explosive ones. They were inaccurately aimed and only one in ten penetrated the unprotected roofs of surface tanks. In general, free falling bombs were less effective than high-velocity shells or rockets of greater penetrating power. In the field of protected storage, the British, after 1940, profited from French experience. The French, in their pre-war measures had concentrated on erecting splinter proof concrete walls, about fifteen inches thick, around each tank at a distance of three feet from its sides. This proved remarkably effective against all but the very infrequent direct hits. Finally, it must be observed that the Germans did not launch the full-scale, planned assault on British oil facilities which they themselves were to endure in years to come.

Sometimes the enemy provided the answer to a problem. In August 1941, the retreating Germans (or Jerries, as the British soldier used to refer to them) left behind 80,000 twenty-litre steel petrol containers, shaped rather like suitcases. They were found to be far easier to handle and more economical in transport space than anything the British were using to date. Their design was promptly adopted as a British standard and they became the well-known "Jerricans".

When considering the threat of invasion, plans for the destruction of large oil stocks had to be drawn up. The main problem was to decide who should give the order for destruction. It was agreed that it should not be given precipitately; that it should be given not only when it was absolutely clear that the stocks would fall into enemy hands but were unlikely to be recovered. It was contended that this decision could not be left to local Commanders and there was a body of opinion which held that the risk of large stocks being captured intact should be accepted. They could subsequently be destroyed by gunfire or air attack if recapture was clearly not possible. The final decision was that the C-in-C Home Forces could order the destruction of stocks at major installations, but local Commanders were

empowered to order pumping equipment at threatened storage points to be put out of action. This would deny the enemy his immediate battle requirements during the vital days before a counter-attack could be staged. This decision was modified in mid-1941 when the Army considered that the growing German armoured strength made the risk of leaving stocks in enemy hands no longer acceptable. The power to destroy major stocks during an invasion was then given to Corps Commanders.

Pre-war calculations of the tanker tonnage needed in war rested on the premise that more tankers would be available for work in the British and Empire trades in war than in peace time. This was so in the initial stages of the war and, after the German invasion of France, the Low countries, Denmark and Norway, vessels belonging to these countries either came over to the British side or were seized in prize. The American Neutrality Act of 1935 caused the British to base their war planning on the denial of American oil resources. This position was maintained even after the U.S. Neutrality Act of 1937 proved to be less severe. As the war progressed and Britain's position became increasingly critical, lend-lease aid and, later, America's entry into the war changed things.

Some pre-war plans and estimates did not stand up to the test of war. For example, the examination of tanker turn-round at British ports was superficial. The problems of adequate storage at the berths, the restrictions caused by hydrographic and geographic characteristics of the ports, the inhibitions caused by local safety restrictions which port authorities were loath to relax, the varying efficiency of pumping systems, the delays caused by refits (including, for example, the fitting of degaussing apparatus) or by repairs (and the need for "gas freeing" before they could be carried out) were insufficiently appreciated and, in the event, port congestion proved to be a major problem even when the tanker tonnage was reasonably adequate. A special branch of the Tanker Tonnage Section of the Petroleum Department had to be set up to keep this problem under continuous scrutiny and analysis, receiving regular returns from each port on its performance and delays. The Americans, who by this time were assisting the British with oil and tankers, were highly critical of this situation and the U.S. Maritime Commission sent a team to Britain to enquire into it. The team made several recommendations, some of which were accepted and some (including two for improving the morale of tanker masters and crews) were rejected. The Americans followed this up by appointing a "Special Naval Observer" on the Staff of the U.S. Embassy in London to keep an eye on this aspect. Oddly enough, in 1941 the worst delays in tanker programming were in



British ports; in 1942, they were in the ports and coastal waters of America, and it was the turn of the British to be critical.

In 1943, combined Anglo-American programming began and the foundations were laid for combined machinery to manage tanker tonnage. The Americans gradually moved into a dominant position in this partnership, particularly when oil demands soared as a result of the massive amphibious and other operations carried out by the Allies in Europe, Africa and the Pacific. The partnership was not without its problems and the reports of the British representatives on combined Government agencies were severely critical of the Americans. Phrases about suspicion and lack of faith were not uncommon. The Americans had more resources; the British considered that they had acquired more experience. Their comments on American plans were sometimes very blunt. For example: "My whole reaction to this (American) paper is that it is entirely theoretical and simply stinks of amateurishness". The Americans were suspicious of British statistics and, as the end of the war drew near, they even believed that the British were less concerned with the immediate prosecution of the war than with improving their post-war position by accumulating stocks at American expense. The author accepts that, conscious of the inferiority of their resources, the British "adopted a defensive posture", though it seemed to be a fiercely defensive one, deliberately so. The British were perhaps in the same position that the French found themselves vis-a-vis the British in the pre-war years. However, the "oil fraternity" of British and American oil companies and their executives maintained strong ties which offset much of the inter-Governmental hiatus.

The monitoring of all aspects of the oil economy was essential. There were many instances of wasteful use of oil (in road haulage operations or in the use of tractors by farmers, for example). More often than not, a fine balance had to be struck between removing the causes of waste or inefficiency and yet not curbing the functioning of useful or essential services. Education and persuasion by publicity campaigns etc., were no less important than the framing of a lot of fresh rules and regulations.

The study briefly refers to India. In the early years of the war, India introduced petrol rationing and ran some producer-gas vehicles. (We had only 120,000 motorists at the time). As the war in the East gained momentum, India became a base for operations against the Japanese. Until it appeared clear that the Japanese had withdrawn from the Bay of Bengal, the east coast ports were not used for tanker shipping. The west coast ports, in fact, bore the burnt of the war in this respect. They were not

really equipped for it and congestion was a normal feature. Repair times were long, due to the shortage of dry docks and other facilities. To make matters worse, the older vessels not considered suitable for Atlantic utilisation were diverted for use in the Indian Ocean. This queered the pitch of the repair problem.

Since most of the oil and other war supplies had to be hauled across the peninsula to the eastern front, India's internal transportation system—mainly her railways—came under great strain. There was an ambitious proposal to lay a thousand mile, 6 inch oil pipeline from Bombay to Allahabad, from where supplies could go by tank barge down the Ganga or by rail routes diverging from the city to the east. Though it was seriously considered at a high level, nothing finally came of it. A more modest project of a 276 mile pipeline from Bombay to Bhusaval was implemented. Several measures of expediency were undertaken to improve matters in Bombay, Karachi and Cochin. Some major modernisation schemes were recommended, but most of them were not completed or even started when the war ended.

There are no two opinions about the importance of oil today. In fact, world oil consumption has doubled every decade since World War II. It is perhaps the greatest single industry in the world. The old oil rich countries are producing more and a number of fresh ones have joined the club; off-shore exploitation proceeds apace; petro-chemical industries are mushrooming; mammoth and super-tankers ply the oceans; thousands of miles of pipelines carrying oil and natural gas are being laid; the small oil-producing countries have begun to assert themselves, individually and through organisations such as OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries). Oil politics are tougher than ever before, particularly for countries whose dependence on this commodity is great. Wars are still fought, though not on the world-wide scale and of the duration of World War II; and the weapons to attack oil installations and carriers are more sophisticated and devastating than before.

Not all the lessons and experiences so carefully and lucidly explained in this book will apply today, but many of them are still valid. The British war histories were initially launched to "fund experience for Government use". It is a fund we can profitably draw upon—exercising, of course, the right perspicacity.

# GRAND STRATEGY:

## A REVIEW ARTICLE

COLONEL R. RAMA RAO

**S**HORTLY after the end of World War II, the Government of Britain had commissioned the writing of a comprehensive History of the Second World War, which besides dealing exhaustively with the different campaigns fought during the course of the war, was to include volumes dealing with special aspects of the war such as "The Defence of the United Kingdom", "The War at Sea" and "The Strategic Air Offensive". It was soon realised that there was a need "to provide a broad survey of events from an Inter Service point of view". Accordingly Government directed that a series of volumes on Grand Strategy be produced in order to supplement the series on the several major campaigns and special aspects of the war.

This was to be covered in six volumes of which the fifth was first published, followed by the second and the third. The fourth, written by professor Michael Howard has now been published. It is a work of monumental proportions and deals exhaustively with the period from July 1942 to October 1943. It was in this period that the Allied Powers having blunted the advance of the Axis Powers in all the principal theatres of war, slowly but decidedly swung to the offensive. Accordingly during this period, allied plans which had earlier been evolved had to be implemented and as campaigns proceeded, allied grand strategy had to be constantly reviewed and developed into further concrete plans for action taking into account the needs and susceptibilities of allied governments. Also purely from the standpoint of Britain, Imperial needs had to be taken into account as well as campaign and inter-service priorities settled.

All these have been admirably documented and expounded by Prof Howard. His purpose, as explained in the Author's Preface, has been to provide students of contemporary affairs not merely with an account of Allied Grand Strategy as it evolved, but also with material from authoritative documents - which but for a recent policy decision on the part of the

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\*Grand Strategy : August 1942 - September 1943, V. 4. by Michael Howard. Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1972, PP 773 Price £7.25.



British Government - would not have been available to those not having access to classified State Papers.

Grand Strategy, as stated by Professor Butler in his Preface to the Second Volume in the Series dealing with events from the commencement of World War II in September 1939 to the German invasion of Soviet Russia in June 1941, covers both military strategy as well as politics. This concept started taking practical shape during the First World War, when British forces had to operate in co-operation with two major allies-USA and France and war became "too serious a matter to be left to Generals alone". Recognition of this was implicit in Sir William Robertson's (then Chief of the Imperial General Staff) observation that "the real Headquarters of armies these days are to be found not in the field of battle abroad but at the seat of government at home and plans of campaign are, and must be, analysed and criticised by Ministers at the council tables in a way quite unknown a few decades ago".

This became even more obvious during World War II when Britain had to mobilise her entire resources and secure allied support to her cause in order to survive and then evolve grand strategies for jointly managing the war. Management of war involves formulating objectives in order of priority, evolving overall plans for attaining the objectives, mobilising the resources needed, effectively supervising the conduct of operations, and taking necessary corrective and coordinating action as plans progress. All this calls for action at political, technological, industrial and military levels. But political direction is the key to effective co-ordination and therefore of success.

Allied Grand Strategy for the conduct of World War II was evolved in 1941 following the American-British Staff Conference in Washington. Essential features of allied war strategy were defined and the steps required to be taken during 1942 in furtherance of the strategy were also outlined. As the war progressed, emphasis on operations in particular theatres tended to shift in response to the actions of the Axis Powers. However, even before the Axis Powers were at the height of their glory in mid 1942, the Allies had managed to evolve a unified and comprehensive war strategy.

A pertinent point is that made by one British Chief of staff - Lord Tedder-that the strategic problems to be studied are those that confront a democracy at the beginning of a war, when things tend to go wrong and not necessarily those that come to the surface towards the end of a war when the country is winning. This would underscore the importance of studies, appreciations concerning the attitudes and probable actions of potentially

hostile powers and the formulation of contingency plans, political and military to safeguard one's security.

A second point that might be mentioned is the way the Tube Alloys Project (building the Atom Bomb) was managed by Britain and America. At the Quebec Conference of August 1943, Mr Churchill and President Roosevelt had agreed on the procedures to be followed concerning cooperation in scientific research and industrial development between the two countries.

Britain knew from the work of emigre German scientists that a weapon of appalling destructive potential could be built from U 235, provided the material is obtained on an industrial scale. The Maud Committee set up in April 1940 had indicated that 25 lb of active Uranium would have the explosive power of 1800 tons of TNT, and that the explosion would produce intense radioactivity. The Committee had also indicated that for obtaining active Uranium in the quantities needed, expensive refining establishments would have to be set up. Also a large number of highly skilled scientists would have to work continuously on the project. Similar effort and expense would have to be incurred in producing heavy water, which also would be needed in large quantities.

Later in 1942 when the Maud Committee Report was being discussed with American authorities, it became clear to British scientists that a large number of people were working in America on the same problems. American resources being vastly greater than Britains, America would be able to solve the technical problems sooner than Britain. In order to retain an interest in the outcome of the 'project, British scientists recommended that Britain provide America with all the information at their disposal and let America build the facilities required for producing atom bombs. Some British leaders - especially Lord Anderson, the Cabinet Minister directly responsible for Tube Alloys and Lord Cherwell, Churchill's principal scientific adviser were not convinced that the necessary plant could not be built in Britain and were reluctant to entrust America with the task of constructing the plant because of the potential importance of the weapon. However, it was clear to British scientists who had known of American scientific efforts at first hand, that either Britain cooperates with the USA by giving whatever technical data they had or Britain runs the risk of being completely left behind, because the USA "would outstrip Britain in ideas, research and application of nuclear energy and that then, quite rightly, they would see no reason for Britain to butt in".

These arguments were eventually accepted by Churchill and his Council of Ministers and Britain and America concluded the Tube Alloys agreement which provided that the two parties :—

- (a) Would never use the weapon against each other.
- (b) Would not use it against third parties without each other's consent.
- (c) Would not communicate any information to third parties without each other's consent.

The Agreement also provided that any post war advantages of an industrial or commercial character, arising from the Tube Alloys project shall be dealt with as between USA and Britain on the terms to be specified by the President of USA to the Prime Minister of Britain. This clause was considered in Britain as surrender to America but as noted in the agreement itself it was in recognition of the enormous investments that America was called upon to make in progressing the project.

The point to note however is the clarity of vision of British and American leaders, and the sense of realism that inspired their actions.

Prof Howard's work would be of great value to historians, students of contemporary affairs, service officers as well as those concerned with the formulation of national policies.



# CONSERVATION OF OUR WILD LIFE

MAJOR BALJIT SINGH

*On 30 May 1972, the Prime Minister wrote to the Chief of the Army Staff "....Reports of indiscriminate killing of animals in different parts of the country, notably the Himalayas by Army personnel are disturbing....There are also reports of fish being killed by the use of explosives.*

*"The Armed Forces are the guardians of our national interest in peace as well as in war. Hence we need their help in preserving our fauna and flora, so essential not only for the beauty of our country but also for the well-being of our people....."*

*This article analyses the reasons for the concern felt by the Prime Minister and the Chief and suggests how we in the Armed Forces can help in conserving India's wild life.*

**I**N the mid-nineteenth century, the rail-road builders and the Yankee cattle-ranchers, seized by their narrow developmental urge had succeeded in decimating the American prairie bison. Concurrently, the ignorant sportsman shot the last Passenger Pigeon. And then, the American nation was stunned by their self-inflicted and irretrievable loss. So, they created a National Department for Conservation and passed legislation to "Conserve Nature and Natural Resources.....for the enjoyment of future generations". Similar legislation was also enforced by civic or governmental decrees in Europe. However, the wealthy and arrogant European sportsmen were opposed to such radicalism and they now turned their focus to African wild life which afforded full play to their instincts of mass slaughter of game. Here too, the devoted pioneers rose to the occasion and brought about the formation of Game Preserves or National Parks as they are now called....but only just before the brink of total disaster.

The Indian subcontinent too suffered the fate of Africa but to a considerably lesser degree. On the eve of Independence, India's wild life heri-

tage was in a favourable credit balance. But it is a slur on our nationalism that within the next five years, our countrymen carried the wanton slaughter of our wild life and violation of game rules to the limit of incomprehension. Mr. Nehru rose to the occasion and constituted the Indian Board for Wild Life in 1952. The Board carried out an exhaustive survey and the same year recommended that certain species of wild life which were either believed extinct or nearing extinction should be totally protected by legislation. These species were, the Pink Headed Duck, Black Buck, Tiger, Great Indian Bustard, Gir Lion, Pigmy Hog, Four-Antlered Deer, Hungool, Cheetah, Clouded Leopard, Snow Leopard and two more species whose names now evade my memory—possibly Rhinoceros and Musk Deer. However, it is a sad commentary on our priorities that we have procrastinated over this recommendation for 19 years; legislation has just been introduced when most of the above mentioned species are now fighting for their survival with backs to the wall.

### WHY CONSERVE WILD LIFE ?

Unfortunately, the word "Wild Life" has the connotation of "jungle" in our lingua subconscious. Unfortunately again, "jungle" is beastly and something vile and despicable, undeserving of human compassion and consideration. So the protagonists of wild life conservation, how-so-ever radical their zeal, come to an unsurmountable hurdle at the very beginning. Hence our answer to the question, "Why conserve wild life," assumes importance.

Purely from a soldier's point of view, conservation is vital so that we can continue to indulge in the sport of 'shikar'. Its virtues of character building, learning of practical field craft, infinite skill in handling small arms and pitching one's energies against the elements are some of the assets well known. A doubt might arise here that I am indulging in double talk; conservation and shooting. Well, the conservationists are friends of the shikaries so long as the shooting is kept within limits of procreation of a particular species. In fact, the most level-headed conservationists are also Shikaris in which category the late Jim Corbett and E.P. Gee's names come to mind at once. However, from the broader perspective, conservation is necessary for ecological and educational reasons. From the layman's point of view, ecology is better understood as "Balance of Nature". In the scheme of things of Nature, each species acts as a check on the overgrowth of another species. For instance, the over-growth of pigs and deer in the Gir forest is checked by the Gir lion. Should we kill all pigs and deer in that region, the lions will become a menace to domestic livestock

and human beings. Also, the jackals that feed on the remnants of the lions' kill will infest our cities and lead to an epidemic of rabies to which dreaded disease there is no sure cure yet. On the other hand, if we were to kill all the lions and jackals, then the pig and deer will outgrow the domestic livestock and destroy crops and by grazing convert the area into a desert. So, by elimination or even by decreasing the numbers of one species, we upset the "Balance of Nature" which leads to disastrous chain reactions eventually leading to a stage under which neither the genuine sportsman can indulge in his pastime nor can the survival of the species be assured.

#### EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS

So much for sport and economy. Coming to the educational benefits, I will cite two examples. Of late, the ways of the Dolphin, its homing instincts which carries it thousands of miles across uncharted oceans and its ability to avoid collision with other objects while moving at tremendous speed, have prompted a billion-dollar research programme by the US Navy. It might revolutionise submarine warfare and give fringe benefits to civilian life as well. On the other hand, take the case of storks in two districts of Germany. The Alsace Storks always migrate to Greece and from the other districts they go to Morocco. It was believed that the new-borns merely follow their parents over their traditional migratory routes. But this has been disproved now. They interchanged the eggs in the storks' nests in Alsace with eggs from the nests of the other districts and vice-versa. The fledglings were born and when the time for migration came, they disinherited their foster parents and crossed over to their traditional migratory lands without any outside guidance. This has established the fact that the guidance instinct is implanted in the eggembryo. This too holds tremendous potentialities for science and educational fields.

But the most down to earth reason for conservation of wild life is that it is a heritage which each generation is indebted to hand over to posterity, for the sheer fun of watching wild life in its natural habitat. We have nearly 2,500 resident species of wild life in our country and each one of them provides infinite opportunities for either watching their ways in the jungles for the sheer joy of it, of photographing them or for carrying out ecological research. The aesthetic values of life are hard to rationalize but they are there. So, if you go to the DSSC Wellington, do not miss the chance of camping out or staying in the Mukriti Shikar Hut with the intention of tracking the Nilgiri Ibex or Thar. There are about one hundred only and when after miles and miles of walking over perhaps two days, you come upon a herd, what an imperial elation one feels at having seen the only surviving



species in the World. Not only that, but their ways of descending and ascending vertical rock cliffs are beyond human imagination.

But the most economical and easy of access for observing and enjoying wild life are two spots in North India. The first is Akbar's tomb at Sikandra, outside Agra. Little known, yet inside its enclosure is a herd of over one hundred Black Buck. There is nothing more graceful than the prancing, the gliding jump and the defiant trot of the Black Buck with the antlers thrown back in arrogance. Besides these resident species, we are fortunate to have nearly 300 species that migrate to our country each year. A majority of these are water-fowl and there is no better place to watch their congregation than at the Ghana sanctuary near Bharatpur. Their cacophony at dawn and dusk is deafening but what a World of coloured feathers. I have got to be cautious of space, otherwise I could give you a spot to observe and enjoy wild life, in close vicinity, wherever you may be posted. Of course, it is dreadful to lift the bliss of ignorance.

Now I come to the question with which we are most concerned. What are the elements opposed to conservation of wild life? The basic factor is the one-sided developmental activity (once again I lay myself open to criticism, but wait till you have read to the finish). At present there is a tremendous pressure on land both for new industry and grow-more-food. As a result, large tracts of jungle and scrub-land and ravine are being levelled out or very vast areas are being submerged by dam-waters. Consequently, wild-life is getting pushed farther and farther. A stage has now been reached where, either the species will perish due to epidemics caused by congestion or the poacher will slaughter them as they must venture out for sheer survival. Yet another hazard would be that the few forests that may avoid the developmental axe will have such a density of wild life that overgrazing will create erosion of sufficient magnitude to further contribute to the annual floods. There is a need, therefore, to set aside sufficient area for wild life which should be declared as National Parks. So far as agriculture is concerned, happily, the emphasis has already changed from extensive to intensive which holds a promise for leaving home for our wild life. If properly coordinated, the hills surrounding the dams would have created perfect sanctuaries for our wild life.

Alas, it is too late. For, to feed the armies of labourers during the construction stage, the unscrupulous contractors employed professional poachers to run regular venison and pork shops at labour camps. So Bhakra-Nangal and Tunga-Bhadra, to mention only two, will never again see any wild life in their vicinity. We have allowed ourselves to be lead to

the same situation as America in the last century and Africa at the turn of the current century. To cite two examples; the cheetah was once so abundant that Akbar had 1,000 as pets. Now it is totally extinct in the wild. Of course, you may see two African cheetahs in the Delhi Zoo which are a distant cousin of our Cheetah. Similarly, the Pink Headed Duck was last seen in 1932. The only reminder of its past existence are seven skins preserved, by the Bombay Natural History Society and a stuffed pair at a museum at Patna, I think. Likewise, the latest census of the Great Indian Bustard has revealed less than 60 birds surviving. And the pride of our jungles, the tiger, has dwindled to mere 1,800 from 60,000 at the time of Independence. The time is, therefore, fast running out and we must enforce legislation for the establishment of National Parks and the protection of wild life therein.

### FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS

The other factor which has contributed to the present sad state of depletion of our wild life is the ignorance of the ethics of the sport. Here, I would hold the Armed Forces fully guilty. In the beginning of this century Gerald Burard wrote a fat book of nearly 350 pages on the wild life of Ladakh. Today, there is not enough wild life in Ladakh to write more than three pages. And there has been no industrial or grow-more-food activity that could have led to this disaster. The conclusion is, therefore, unavoidable. Living off-the-land is justifiable when prosecuting war in enemy territory only. We must, therefore, follow the basic ethics of the sport and guide our young officers and men to adopt a sane approach. The fundamental rules should be :—

- (a) Never shoot in closed season. This is about universal in the whole country from March to 15 October each year.
- (b) Never shoot more than the prescribed limit on your licence. Incidentally, a mere arms licence does not empower you to shoot. For the sport, a separate licence is required each year for each State in the country.
- (c) Shoot only for yourself or family. Never shoot for a party or for pickling as that leads to wanton slaughter. In any case, after a few drinks no one can tell a Duck from a Goose. Try it if you do not believe me.
- (d) Do not shoot the female of the species for obvious reasons. With little experience, you can positively distinguish the sexes among animals and also among certain feather game.

- (e) Shoot only such adult animals which will make a worthy trophy. And having acquired one trophy of a species, please do not shoot another.
- (f) And lastly, game trophies look majestic in an Officers Mess. They look vulgar and hideous in a gentleman shikari's home.

I may have painted an alarming picture but if I did not, I would be dodging the truth. The Black Buck or the Indian Antelope which inhabited only this country in the whole wide World, has no longer that place of pride today. In our country, it has reached the stage of near extinction. Our grandchildren will have to go to Texas to see their native antelope where it has been introduced by the American sportsman and is now flourishing. But there is hope yet, provided we develop compassion for our wild life, derive equal pleasure both from shikar and watching it in sanctuaries and follow and ensure that other around us also follow, the fundamental ethics of the sport. I have not any reference material with me, otherwise I could have quoted most moving poetry and prose in defence of conservation of our wild life. But suffice it to say, that it is one of our national assets. Perhaps it would be apt to close with a farsighted remark by King George VI, "The wild life of today is not ours to dispose of as we please. We have it in trust, and must account for it to those who come after."



## BOOK REVIEWS

### THE PRESIDENT AND THE MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

ed. by Keith C. Clark and Laurence J. Legere

(Published by Frederick A Praeger 1969) Pp 274 Price \$ 6.95

**T**HIS is a specialised study by the International and Social Studies Division of the Institute for Defence Analyses of USA, which had initiated the effort in early 1968 and completed the project in November that year, with a view to informing President L.B. Johnson's Administration as well as President-elect R.M. Nixon's staff about the problems and processes of national security in the USA. It was an independent study, not commissioned by the US Government or any of its agencies.

National security in the USA is looked after by the National Security Council, which, together with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was created by the National Security Act, passed by the US Congress in 1947. The other agency which is directly concerned with the security of that country, i.e. the 'Department of Defence', was set up in 1949, and reorganised the same year, and afterwards in 1953 and 1958.

The main responsibility for ensuring the security of the USA lies on the shoulders of the President, who is the chairman of the National Security Council, and it is upto him how he makes use of the assessments emanating from the National Security Council. The NSC is a formalised part of the decision-making process in national security, but it is the individual style of a particular President on which depends the effectiveness of this organisation. "Because each President has used the NSC in his own way, its actual role and responsibilities have varied widely. At a minimum level, the NSC has been used as a forum for decisions already made by the President and requiring interagency coordination. More often, it has been used as the principal arena for debating alternative strategic courses of action and ensuring that all the relevant considerations were thoroughly considered in making a final decision."

Despite the many adjustments and adaptations in national security arrangements during the past years it is the personality and working style of the President that is more important than the procedures of decision-making. It is the President who ultimately decides whether the National Security Council, the Departments of State and Defence, the White House, or a Kissinger will enjoy meaningful power in influencing his decisions.

The process, however ideally formulated and conscientiously observed, cannot ensure fool-proof national security, unless the system can be utilised wisely to achieve the best results.

"Process cannot supply omniscience or perfection. It can help to minimise the risks of haphazardness in the formulation and implementation of policy". This publication is a very important addition to the literature of this kind. Anyone reading it will find it most useful, informative and interesting.

The book contains a good bibliography.

—B.C.

#### STRATEGIC INTERACTION

by Erving Goffman

(Published by University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1969). Pp 145 Price \$ 3.45

COMMUNICATION is a field which has drawn the attention of sociologists from time to time. But there are major gaps in carrying out research in this particular area. With this perspective in mind, Erving Goffman has taken up this project with financial support from the Institute of International Studies, University of California, and the Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University.

The author has limited the scope of his project to a study of face-to-face interaction and its use for strategic purposes. In pursuit of their interest, human beings have to deal with groups or individuals and in this process they have to orient themselves to the expected behaviour of others and behave accordingly. According to the author, although communication is applied to socially organised channels for transceiving information, it has received very little systematic ethnographic attention. (p. ix).

The two chapters—Expression Games and Strategic Interaction—throw light on communicative behaviour and analyze its implications for non-communicative areas in games theory.

In an Expression Game, there are two types of actors i.e. the interrogator and the subject. The game operates with the communication between the two. In discussing the counter-uncovering moves, the author cites the tactful handling of the Cuban crisis by President Kennedy. For a successful interaction between the observer and observed, he emphasizes the method of seductive penetration. Even slight weakness by either side might mar the game. A good observer, according to the author must be aware of what the subject is aware of and the good subject must be aware of what the observer knows (p. 72). In applying the expression game to statecraft, he suggests that a decision maker has to make fateful decisions on the basis of the appearances of good faith of those with whom he negotiates. (p. 81).i The author also talks of gains from assessing expressions and manipulation in every social situation.

In a game of strategy there is conflict of interest as well as possible co-operation among the participants and here the outcome of a player cannot

be determined by mere probability. (International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, Vol. 6, 1968, p 62): Erving's paper on strategic interaction attempts, in his own words, to isolate the analytical framework implied in the game perspective, and show its relationship to other perspectives in analyzing interpersonal dealings (p. 85). Hence two parties are involved in mutual impingment. Thus one part of strategic interaction consists of concrete courses of action taken in the real world that constrains the party. The other parts consist of a special kind of decision making, decisions made by directly orienting oneself to the other parties and giving weight to their situation. Social norms, according to him, impose limitations on the game-worthiness of individuals. Norms can be treated as limitations of the game. The sequence of interaction followed by the author are assessment, decision-making, initiating a course of action and payoff.

On the whole the book, although loaded with technical terminology, provides enough guide-lines not only to communication engineers, but to decision makers, especially on foreign policy and strategists. It adds new dimensions to the art of spying.

—PKM

#### CONFLICT. CRISIS AND WAR IN PAKISTAN

by Kalim Siddiqui

(Published by Macmillan, London, 1972) Pp 217 Price £ 2.95

**D**R Kalim Siddiqui is obviously an angry young man. He spares no one, no one at all. He feels deeply the humiliation and break-up suffered by Pakistan in December 1971 and holds everyone to blame for it—the Aligarh-educated intellectual elite, the landed aristocracy, the new business magnates, the Civil Service, the Army and, of course, India.

According to Dr Siddiqui's thesis, the seeds of Pakistan were sown when Sayyid Ahmad Khan founded the Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh. He created a Muslim "protestant" elite in India whose first and foremost duty was to be loyal to the British. In a very short time, this elite began to receive a substantial share of titles and jobs in the British administrative hierarchy. Apart from loyalty to the British, the main interest of this elite was the prevention of any democratic development in India in view of the large Hindu majority. The Muslim League was thus started by men who were instruments of British imperialism. Even after the formation of Pakistan, this aristocratic and intellectual elite retained its exclusive outlook. As if in answer to a tacit understanding, the elite intellectuals who became the first rulers of Pakistan, the feudal landlords who provided the leadership of the Muslim League, the pucca sahibs of the Civil Service of Pakistan (lately of the I.C.S.) and the armed forces which became the premier instrument of State policy, kept themselves isolated from the mass of the people. The legal framework into which the new dominion was born, the Government of India Act of 1935 conveniently lent itself to the imposition of oligarchic des-



potism. The author describes this Act as the "second-hand garment that Jinnah picked up in a Delhi shop, and the tailor's agent, Mountbatten, delivered to him personally in Karachi on 14th August, 1947". He does not even spare Jinnah who is dubbed "the retired English gentleman" and later on as the "Viceroy" of Pakistan.

At one time, Dr Siddiqui had aspired to a commission in the Pakistan Army but "was thrown out" of the training school as not being suitable officer material. Since 1954, he has been living in the U.K. where his twin pursuits are journalism and education. His first-hand knowledge of Pakistan is not, therefore, extensive. He was too young in undivided India to have been able to form any independent opinions. He sees history through coloured glasses. In his view, the British took over India directly from the Mughals; the Indian Mutiny was exclusively a Muslim affair; and the Khilafat Movement was the last major challenge the British had to face before they divided India and quit. The Congress and the Muslim League are equated in almost all respects. In his view the sole concern of the Hindu trading class from which the Congress drew sustenance was to eliminate British economic preponderance and thereby to inherit India's wealth. "In flattery, sycophancy meekness, humility and conservatism, these Muslim League leaders were the equal of those Hindus who became the leaders of the 'national Congress'".

Dr Siddiqui blames the infamous "twenty-two" families almost as much as does the present President of Pakistan. Because of the activities of these entrepreneurs in East Bengal, the issue of right versus left developed into one of West against East. While condemning the West Pakistani dictators, he also chides Mujib for not substituting "Joi Pakistan" for "Joi Bangla". "To the Bengalis' eternal shame, the first blood in the civil war was drawn by them", he declares. But he concedes that it was Yahya who finally called out the Army to suppress the Awami League "in one of the bloodiest actions taken by professional soldiers against an unarmed civilian population". Of the actual Indo-Pak war which was started by Yahya on 3rd December, he has little to say except that the surrender was shameful and made little sense. Possibly six thousand miles between his adopted country and the scene of operations was responsible for this heroic stance. Lest his patriotism be suspect, Dr Siddiqui winds up with the peroration—"Pakistan was right, is right and the concept of the State remains valid irrespective of the failure of its leaders".

—NND

#### COOPERATIVE LEADERSHIP IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

by International Cooperative Alliance

(Published by Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1963) Pp 134 Price Rs 8.25.

THE cooperative movement in India and elsewhere has its deep root in the past. But it has gained greater momentum only recently. The Seminar held in New Delhi on International Cooperative Alliance in November 1960 focused attention on the major problems in this field especially in South and South-East Asia. Fortunately all the lectures delive-

red at the Seminar have come in the form of the present book. Dr. Mauritz Bonow, a participant scholar from Sweden, while writing a foreword rightly says that within the framework of democratic planning, the Cooperative Movement has been looked upon in the developing countries as the most important means for achieving decentralisation of economic power and structuring democracy at the "grass root" level. (p. VII).

Jawaharlal Nehru in his introductory talk pleads for a broad-based cooperative movement in India. Mauritz Bonow while writing on the role of cooperation in economic and social development profusely cites examples from Scandinavian countries, especially Sweden. The major theme of his essay is that besides bringing economic gains, cooperative enterprises educate the people in democratic popular movement. Bhide, while writing on cooperation in a planned economy, holds the view that the cooperative movement being essentially meant for the people, the major initiative must come from them but the overall policy has to be made by the State.

Watkins in the chapter entitled "Functions, Qualities and Qualifications of leaders" strongly feels that a leader in a cooperative organisation has primarily to show his few cooperators the way ahead (p. 42). He should also possess the inborn qualities of character, temperament and intelligence rather than only professional talent. Three more papers subscribe on leadership. Weeraman holds the view that the role of leadership would be to guide the society so that it will grow from strength to strength as the all-inclusive organisation for the solution of economic problems on a voluntary, universal, democratic and non-profit-making basis. (p. 61). Karve pleads for professional education to members at various levels.

The late D.R. Gadgil expects the leaders in cooperative institutions to possess a certain awareness of social purpose, some administrative ability and a business outlook.

Two papers on the forms of external guidance and stimulus discuss the extent of autonomy that the cooperatives can enjoy. Ryan pleads for financial autonomy and managerial skill. Jain emphasizes the primacy of non-official leadership in the cooperative movement.

A.Q. Ansari and V.N. Nyi in their papers on "The Role of Secondary Organisations in Developing Leadership at the District & National Levels" justify the need for training to members and the need for coordination & integration between the central authority and local units. S.K. Dey in the last paper "Decentralised Cooperative Economy—Our Policy & Problems" feels that the cooperative enterprises strike a balance between the Private and public sector. For him Panchayati Raj and cooperative movement are concomitant to each other. The last chapter throws light on basic concepts and background material and makes some constructive suggestions about cooperative venture.

The overall impression that one gets, after going through the pages, is that it is a rewarding exercise to educate our people about the cooperative movement through such works. But the title of the book seems to be misleading, because there is little reference to South-East Asian countries in the various Chapters.

—PKM

## THE MIDDLE EAST : TEMPLE OF JANUS

by Desmond Stewart

(Published by Hamish Hamilton, London, 1971) Pp 414 Price £ 4.00

THE inhuman and dastardly murder of the Israeli sportsmen at the Munich Olympics shocked the world. The Israeli reprisals on the Palestinian guerrillas have been no less savage and barbaric. Such brutalities are manifestations of a deep-rooted problem, the solution of which has defied all for nearly a quarter of a century. Three wars have been fought, and each war has made the situation more complicated. The Arabs and the Jews are still arming themselves at an ever increasing rate.

To equip the reader with the necessary background knowledge, and to enable him to sit in judgement over the Arab-Israel issue, the author has chosen to describe the history of the countries involved and of the surrounding nations; personalities and events having a direct bearing on the subject matter. It is history with a difference. The book is more of a roving spotlight on the complex drama that history has enacted and is continuing to do. The author gives vividly and with a literary verve considerable details of specific events and people to emphasise the points in his thesis. This he has done with considerable finesse. The authors starting point is the year 1869 when the Suez Canal was opened to traffic and he takes us to the present day. He has been very fair and objective in presenting both sides of the case. Neither does he get into any arguments nor does he suggest any solution. The author's background, wherein he has seen the Middle East from close quarters, and the vast research he has put in, make the book a fine study. It is a readable account, and even those who find history loathsome will find it well worth their time to go through the sparkling prose, lifelike conversations, descriptive passages and biographical sketches.

—RNG

## THE WAR OF THE RUNNING DOGS: HOW MALAYA DEFEATED THE COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS 1948-60

by Noel Barber

(Published by Collins, London, 1971) Pp 284 Price £ 2.25

OVER a dozen books have been published on the campaign against the Communist guerrillas in Malaya, which spanned twelve years, from 1948 to 1960. Noel Barber is a journalist who has written books on a variety of subjects history, travel, politics, war and adventure. In this work, he mixes history with personalised narrative, sustaining interest with a skilful arrangement of his material and lively, if sometimes overblown, prose.

The campaign is divided into three phases: The Communist offensive (1948-51), the Counter-Attack (1952-54) and the Road to Victory (1954-60).



Groups of British forces operated in a guerrilla role in Malaya during the Japanese occupation. Some of the key Communist guerrillas in the campaign described in this book, including their leader Chin Peng, fought the Japanese as part of the British guerrilla groups. In fact, Chin Peng and others participated in the Victory Parade in London. Colonel Spencer Chapman, who served in one of these groups (Force 136), described Chin Peng as "Britain's most trusted guerrilla".

The strategy of the Communist guerrillas was also divided into three phases. Phase One was to attack in the villages, forcing the Government to withdraw to the bigger towns. Phase Two embraced the setting up of firm guerrilla bases in the liberated rural areas, to consolidate gains and prepare for the next phase. Phase Three was an all-out offensive against towns, villages, railways and other public services to disrupt the economy and throw the security forces out of gear.

The Communists were initially estimated to number five thousand, mostly Chinese, recruited from squatter families which eked out a miserable existence on the jungle fringe. Against this, the Security Forces could pit a Police force of 10,233 officers and men and eleven battalions of soldiers.

The author explains that, at the start of the campaign, the Police force was split down the seams by internal politics. The cleavage stemmed from bitter hostility between the police officers who stayed at their posts when the Japanese attacked (and consequently spent about four years in Changi gaol) and those who got away, even though many of the latter parachuted back to fight behind the Japanese lines. Later, a third unsettling element appeared on the scene with the introduction of a number of officers from the British Palestine Police Force, who were efficient and tough, but whose presence was resented by the others. It was not till 1953, with the arrival of a new Police Chief (Colonel Arthur Young of the City of London Police) that the differences were ironed out. The force was then expanded and better equipped and its efficiency was stepped up.

Noel Barber attributes what he calls two historic decisions to Sir Henry Gurney, the High Commissioner in late 1948. First, that the armed forces must not control the war. ("What was needed was armed support for a political war and not political support for an Army war"). Second, that the 600,000 Chinese squatters must be uprooted and resettled in "New Villages", where they would be given land and facilities to exploit it. The villages, under the tight protection of the security forces, would be a means of denying the Communists their best sources of intelligence, food supplies and recruitment. It was also an attempt to win the hearts and minds of the squatter population.

The advent of Lt. Gen. Sir Harold Briggs as Director of Operations resulted in the Briggs Plan. Its aims were to dominate the populated areas and break up the Communist organisation within them, to carry out the "New Village" plan and to force the guerrillas to fight on ground favourable to the security forces. Despite his good work, Briggs left, in 1952, a somewhat disillusioned man. He had not been a Commander but "a coordinator under civilian control" and even as Director of Operations he did not have the control he needed over the police force.

The Conservatives came to power in Britain in late 1951 and the Government, decided that Malaya should be led by one man, firmly in control of civil and military affairs. The choice fell on Lt. Gen. Sir Gerald Templer, who was appointed High Commissioner. A post of Deputy High Commissioner was created and filled by a civil servant. Much has been written about the energetic and decisive way in which Templer functioned; his success in completing the "counter-attack" phase, and placing the country on the third "Road to Victory" phase, before he relinquished office. Templer had a bit of luck; his arrival in Malaya almost coincided with a decision by the guerrilla leadership to switch the emphasis from terror tactics to "legal unrest". This resulted, to some extent, in a significant drop in terrorist killings which popular opinion, unaware of the change in guerrilla policy, admirably attributed to the dynamism and methods of the new High Commissioner.

Templer and others rightly stressed the vital importance of sound intelligence. The author devotes plenty of space to the intelligence activities of the Special Branch of the Security Forces whose task included psychological warfare. The Branch was given a very free hand, its activities were seldom scrutinised except at the highest levels and its advice was given considerable weight. There is no doubt that this organisation paid very handsomely, though it cost quite a lot in rewards and bribes.

The accounts of operations carried out by the Army and Air Force are restricted to descriptions of a few selected missions, possibly because this subject has been covered quite extensively in other books. The Batang Kali affair, which took place in 1948 and was resurrected in the British Press 21 years later as a sort of "My Lai", is briefly touched upon by the author. It is hard to believe that the sergeant-in-charge of the troops did not overact.

The author praises the Malayan leaders, particularly Tengku Abdul Rehman, for the way they assumed power in August 1957 and sustained the thrust and efficiency of the anti-guerrilla operations, whilst pursuing a policy of willingness to negotiate. There was even a meeting between the Tengku and Chin Peng.

According to John Gullick, an authority on Malaya, the campaign was always officially called the "Emergency", never a war. This was done in deference to the London insurance market on which the Malayan economy relied for cover. Insurance rates covered losses of stocks and equipment through riot and civil commotion in an emergency, but not in a civil war. It was estimated that the guerrilla force strength reached a peak of 12,000. Of these, 6698 were killed, 2696 surrendered, 2819 were wounded, and 1286 captured. About a thousand died, deserted or were liquidated by their Commanders. The Security forces lost 1865 killed and 2560 wounded. In addition, 2473 civilians were killed by the guerrillas, 1385 wounded and 810 were missing.

The author has studied a large number of official documents and has interviewed many key personalities involved on the Government side, including some who interrogated or had access to interrogation reports of guerrilla leaders who surrendered to the security forces. This whets one's appetite for a more comprehensive analysis by the guerrillas of the reasons for their lack of success.

Though Noel Barber's book is essentially journalistic, it fills certain historical gaps and gives prominence to the roles played by persons whose activities, the author seems to feel, deserve greater public recognition.

There are illustrations of some of the important personalities involved on both sides. One picture, of a raid on a Communist hideout, does not quite square with the description of the incident in the script. This casts some doubt on its authenticity. The index is confined to personalities.

—VEB

#### THE INDIAN POLITICAL SERVICE : A STUDY IN INDIRECT RULE

by Terence Creagh Coen

(Published by Chatto and Windus, London, 1971) Pp 291 Price £ 3.15

**T**HE first ever book on the Indian Political Service has come from a member of this elite service. The IPS was founded in 1783 and wound up in 1947 on the attainment of independence. Its members were recruited by nomination, two-thirds from the Indian Army and a third from the Indian Civil Service and they served as diplomatic envoys to the courts of the Indian Princes; as political agents to the tribes of Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier and as Consuls in areas adjoining India such as the Persian Gulf.

This service was not Indianised to anything like the extent that the others were. In 1947, its sanctioned cadre stood at 170 officers of whom only 124 were actually serving owing to the stoppage of recruitment on the outbreak of World War II. Of the 124, only 17 were Indians, 12 Muslims, four Hindus and one Sikh. The high number of Muslims is explained by the fact that the service functioned mainly in the Muslim areas.

It was not 'political' in the sense that it had anything to do with party politics or with 'political activities' in the sense of espionage or anything of that kind. To the British it appeared 'political' was synonymous with 'diplomatic'.

Besides providing administrators for the NWFP and Baluchistan and representatives in the Princely States, it provided quasi-diplomatic and consular representatives to countries bordering India like Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan in addition to Persia and the Persian Gulf area. The land of the Nagas was however outside its purview.

The posts outside India varied greatly according to world political developments. At one time there were Political Agencies staffed from India in Canton, Mauritius, Penang, Sumatra, Baghdad and Basra. Of later creation were the posts existing in 1947 of Agents-General for India in China and the US, the Mission to Lhasa and the Consulates in Goa and Pondicherry. Aden for long was controlled by a Resident under the Bombay Government and became for a time a Chief Commissionership under the



Government of India and subsequently a Governorship under the Colonial Office and later a High Commissionership. Aden became part of the People's Republic of South Yemen and was the last colony in Asia to become independent on 30 November 1967.

The two Indian ICS officers in the IPS were Mr. K.P.S. Menon and Mr. Harishwar Dayal, both of whom distinguished themselves in the Foreign Service of free India. Mr. Dayal who was Ambassador in Nepal died in 1964 while on a trek to the Everest region.

Incidentally, no doubt to avoid confusion, the police service in the British days was known as Indian Police (IP) and not IPS as today.

—ATC

# EIGHTEEN YEARS IN THE KHYBER 1879-1898

by Robert Warburton

(Published by Oxford University Press, London 1970) Pp 351 Price Rs 30.

**E**IGHTEEN years in the Khyber can be very trying for an Englishman, especially in the latter half of the nineteenth century when the British Government in India was insistently pursuing a disastrous policy on the North-West Frontier. Yet, for Robert Warburton, those 18 years, part of the 37 he had spent in India, were of tremendous mental and physical activity and, as his book reveals, without doubt the most satisfying years of his life.

Sir Robert's account of these 18 years is extremely wideranging. Besides narrating his personal experiences, he portrays in a very lucid manner the complex picture of inter-tribal affairs in that part of the Pathan Frontier. It is without doubt a masterly portrayal. The characteristics of the Afridis, Mohamands, Hazaras and Yusufzais, and the causes of their eternal inter-tribal rivalry are described exceedingly well.

Warburton, it is obvious, was a very bitter man when he finally left the guardianship of the Khyber. He is very critical of the policy—of the British Government as regards the conduct of affairs with the tribes. He was firmly convinced that the use of Arbabs or middlemen in dealing with the tribes would ultimately bring disaster. And so it did. In 1897 the Khyber posts were overrun by the tribes.

The Khyber debacle broke Warburton. For many long years he had worked hard to gain the love, respect and loyalty of the various Pathan tribes. He had established a wonderful rapport, an enviable relationship between the Sarkar and the tribals. Keeping this in mind, it was not easy for Sir Robert to accept 18 years of hard labour brought to nought in a few days.

His is a highly readable and mature account of the Pathan frontier, at places made exciting by a description of his personal adventures, at places

tinged with sorrow and bitterness when his opinions were rejected out of hand; yet, there is malice towards none, only gratitude for allowing him 18 years of rare experience.

One cannot say more than just endorse the remark of Sir Olaf Caroe that Sir Robert's is one of the best books ever written about the Pathan frontier.

—AT

#### INTO TIBET : THE EARLY BRITISH EXPLORERS

by George Woodcock.

(Published by Faber and Faber, London, 1971) Pp 277 Price £ 2.75

THE Jesuits and the Capuchins were on conversion bound and the Tibet of the late 17th and the early 18th centuries appeared easy meat to them. But they do not seem to have achieved much success in this direction which shows that Buddhism, like Hinduism, had strong feet to stand on. The Tibetans were no savages or cannibals whose souls had to be saved. They had their own culture, much older than that of those who sought to convert them.

"Into Tibet" is an account of the early British explorers and has been edited painstakingly by George Woodcock. It speaks of the great Tibetologist. Italian priest Desideri, as having written a discourse in Tibetan attempting to refute the teachings of the Buddha. The Tibetan sages who had always been addicted to religious debates hailed it as a noble effort but remained unconverted. Desideri in turn confessed that there were times when the religious devotion he saw among the Tibetans made him feel ashamed of his own Christian faith, so lukewarm in comparison.

The early missionaries seemed to have had no difficulty in entering Tibet except those imposed by the physical nature of the land. Those who went to Tsaparang and Shigatse were welcomed hospitably and met that spirit of tolerance which is traditionally associated with the Buddhist creed. The change in the Tibetan attitude towards foreigners dates from the 18th century following a more direct control of Tibetan affairs by the Manchu Emperors of China.

Tibet has been 'out of this world' both in view of the physical nature of the land and of the political restrictions imposed. Today it is only the political but we know that Tibet is no longer the country it was before 1950. What makes the book interesting is the difference. It is no starry-eyed American's account of a trip into Tibet.

It is a story of the early British travellers into this land. George Bogle (1774-75) sent by Warren Hastings. Woodcock writes, could have developed at least a genuine sympathy towards Buddhism (Yellow Hat Gelugpa Order). "Its essential rationality, partly concealed by its crowded Lamaist pantheon

and exotic liturgy, may have appealed to his 18th century mind which quite evidently had little use for the complexities of Christian theology”.

The book makes it clear that in 18th century Tibet, the Chinese were very much a force and no foreigner could get in without the permission of Peking or the Chinese *ambans* in Lhasa.

The first two British explorers .George Bogle and Samuel Turner (1783-84), could not reach Lhasa nor could the third of Warren Hastings' emissaries, a Hindu, Purangir Gosain (1784-85). The fourth, Thomas Manning (1811-12), was a free-lance Sinologist with no official credentials but he did reach Lhasa.

—ATC

#### THE DRIFT TO WORLD WAR 1900-1914

by Charles Petrie

(Published by Ernest Benn, London, 1968) Pp 127 Price 30 s.

ONLY a skilled historian of the calibre of Sir Charles Petrie could present to us such a vast panorama of confused history in a simple, clear and brisk manner. The narrative of the events leading directly to the Great War, their causes and the unfolding of the underlying socio-economic forces and tensions is indeed of a very high class.

The narrative, at all times, flows. Events are dexterously linked up to portray a complete picture. Besides, the main currents, for instance, belligerence, are always the bases on which Sir Charles builds the rest of the historical structure. The role of the individual in history is also recognized, for example, Edward VII's influence on diplomatic relations. By skilfully weaving and blending the main themes the author has shown that a large number of complex factors were responsible for the War and that it is wrong to attribute it to a single cause.

Where Sir Charles fails as a historian is when he begins to speculate. One could talk endlessly and, more important, aimlessly, on the 'ifs' and 'buts' of history. However, it could be argued reasonably that Sir Charles' account is not meant for the serious historian. In which case speculation is welcome since it enhances the readability of the book.

This is undoubtedly a fine account of the pregnant years which culminated in the disastrous war of 1914. Profusely illustrated, it has some excellent photographs. One may not agree with some of the interpretations of the author but that notwithstanding it is a very instructive and illuminating book.

—AT



## MAO PAPERS

ed. by Jerome Ch'en

(Published by Oxford University Press, Bombay 1971) Pp 161 Price Rs. 8.50

THIS publication may be described as an abridged edition of the author's original work—"Mao Papers Anthology and Bibliography"—(published in 1970) in the sense that the essay on Mao's Literary style and the Chronological Bibliography of Mao's writings, which found a place in the earlier edition, have been excluded from the present work.

Perhaps, amongst the world leaders living at present, Mao's name is the most well-known, and his words most oft-repeated. Jerome Ch'en's anthology includes Mao's Letters covering the period from April 1917 to August 1961, commemorative writings (of the 1929-1956 period), talks and conversations (1956-1967), written statements (1955-1958), and instructions (over 1944-1969). The author translated them, some of them being unpublished or little known, from the original, and has edited them with neat annotations.

This is a very interesting publication which not only gives an insight into Mao's versatility as an author and a leader, but also gives an inkling of his role in the Cultural Revolution. The chronological order in which Mao's writings have been arranged have certainly revealed Mao in the correct perspective. It will be welcomed as a useful handbook by those who admire Mao as well as by others who want to examine him constantly as his critics.

—B.C.

## O.E.G.'S : A BIOGRAPHY OF SIR OLIVER EARNEST GOONETILLEKE

by Sir Charles Jeffries

(Published by Pall Mall, London, 1969) Pp 173 Price 35 S.

SIR Oliver Goonetilleke, who rose from the "son of a humble post-master" to Governor-General of Ceylon, was widely known as O.E.G., though some of his associates and acquaintances called him "Goone".

He schooled in local Christian institutions and, when he failed to secure a Government scholarship for education in England, he took the London external B.A. degree, with "English, Old English, Botony, Logic and Psychology". Years later, when well established as a bureaucrat, he attended a post-graduate course at the London School of Economics.

Up to the age of twenty-eight, he eked out a living as a teacher and, briefly, as a journalist. He then joined Government service and his rise, thereafter, was inexorable—assisted, of course, by his patrons and by fortuitous developments in the political scene.

In a little over a decade he was Auditor-General—an office he held for eleven years. When the threat to Ceylon during World War II heightened, he was, at fifty, offered charge of Civil Defence. He seized it as an opportunity to demonstrate his organisational talent and powers of decision and to open avenues not normally available to an Auditor-General. It also brought him into close and continual contact with the two men who mattered most in Ceylon—the Governor and the Commander-in-Chief.

Whilst functioning with vigour and dedication as a civil servant, he shrewdly maintained close associations with Ceylonese political figures. The author goes so far as to say that "the control room of the Civil Defence Department was, in fact, the focal point of the independence movement". This is debatable, but, in the main, O.E.G. was endeavouring to be a sort of catalyst in the reaction between the Colonial Government and those representing Ceylonese nationalism. His role in the discussions over the "Minister's Draft" and the finesse with which he treated the Soulbury Commission are expansively recounted, as also some of his appearances on the international scene.

By 1945, he was Financial Secretary and an "Official Minister". In 1946, when a chance to become the Chief Secretary was being denied to him, he decided that it was more politic to take furlough and visit England, than to make an issue of it. In England, he indulged in some quiet diplomacy to accelerate progress towards the transfer of power, an involvement which drew him further into the political vortex. In late 1947, he resigned his position in the Establishment and accepted office as Minister of Home Affairs and Rural Development. With the advent of independence in 1948, he became his country's first High Commissioner in London. About four years later, he returned home to become a Minister again.

In 1954, he was elevated to Governor-General, the first Ceylonese to hold that office. Towards the end of his statutory four-year tenure, his country went through turbulent times. The 1958 Emergency, declared during the civil strife over Tamil rights, was a major upheaval which, according to the author, was controlled mainly by the robust action of Sir Oliver. His term of office was extended by two years, up to 1960.

In 1959, assassination struck down the Prime Minister, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, and Sir Oliver found himself taking full charge, even to exceed some of the responsibilities prescribed for a Governor General. When his term of office ended in July 1960, nothing was said and he carried on till 1962, when plans for a coup d'état by senior military and police officers were alleged to have been hatched but discovered in time to save the Government. There were insinuations that Sir Oliver and other political leaders of conservative opinion had tacitly or expressly approved of the plans. The Prime Minister, Mrs. Bandaranaike, quietly advised the Queen to replace him, and, in March 1962, he vacated office and left for England.

Sir Oliver regularly received Royal honours during his career—C.M.G. later K.C.M.G., followed by G.C.M.G., as well as a K.C.G.O. and K.B.E. As Governor-General, he maintained much of the pomp and circumstance of his British predecessors. He wore the same imposing uniform, white plumed helmet and all, unlike Rajagopalachari who stuck to his homespun

national dress or S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike who, on returning from England, burnt his Western clothes and vowed never to wear them in his own country. Though he was abstemious in his personal habits ("he was a teetotaller and non-smoker, getting more fun out of his eternal glass of orange juice than others from their stronger potations"), he was genial and gregarious, relishing the company of stimulating people.

On his retirement, he took up residence in England where, among other things, he became the first Asian to be admitted as an underwriter at Lloyds. His shrewd business acumen enabled him to amass a tidy fortune which, indeed, started taking shape during his early days as an auditor in the Railway Department.

A good many pages of this short book are filled with verbatim quotations from Sir Oliver's memoirs. They deal primarily with his version of major events and his part in them. This selection of quotations, though helpful to the narrative, is inadequate for a deep, objective assessment of Sir Oliver's character. They give us glimpses of his literary style and sophistication, his sense of humour, his showmanship; but one needs to know more to confirm or deny the impression that he was inordinately egoistic or to assess the validity of Ceylonese journalist Tarzie Vittachi's description of him as "an old fox". Vittachi refers to "his razor-sharp mind, his adeptness at bluffing his way through the stickiest mess, his ability to visualise the opponents' manoeuvres three moves ahead, his sweeping cynicism, his blase attitude, to scruples which would baulk another man overwhelmed with conscience". The biographer, of course, does not entirely agree with this assessment. They are indeed the only harsh words about Sir Oliver in the whole book.

No biography, particularly one about a political figure, is worth much if it is not a "warts and all" portrait. At any rate, it should not be characterised by the wholesome praise and sentimental gloss one associates with an obituary. Though he asserts that he does not write in a spirit of uncritical adulation, one looks in vain for the warts in the picture Sir Charles Jeffries has painted. Not one weakness, not one foible is dispassionately pinpointed and frankly analysed. The author's vision of his subject is ineffably beatific. This does it more harm than good. Sir Oliver was unquestionably a man of talent and ability, though by no means a world figure or the greatest national one.

The biographer's over-felicitious concentration on the hero distorts somewhat the story of the origin and development of Ceylon's quest for freedom and the impact of freedom struggles elsewhere on its progress. This progress was not characterised by a tremendous and unrelenting mass upsurge as in India or by bloody revolution as in Indonesia. The British handed over power to the Western-oriented elite of Ceylon and, in this process, men like Sir Oliver, who appeared to be an ambitious nationalist as well as an Anglophile, had a role to play. This is probably why his biographer, who spent thirty-nine years in the British Colonial Service (a fact clearly reflected in the way this book is written), sees his subject as he does. He deems it to be the task of the historian "to sift and evaluate the various accounts and so to determine... the objective truth which lies beneath them all". His work does not make that task much easier.



Since the publication of this volume, Ceylon has become a republic and assumed the traditional name of Sri Lanka. Very few of the elite to whom the British transferred power sit in Sri Lanka's Parliament and, in that country today, not every one will cheer Sir Charles' story of Sir Oliver.

—V.E.B.

#### ON LENIN

By Leon Trotsky

(Published by Oxford University Press 1971) Pp 204 Price Rs. 10/.

THIS publication is a fresh translation of the original work in Russian which first appeared in print in 1924, shortly after Lenin's death. As the title indicates, the work is not a biography, but personal reminiscences of a great leader whom the author knew intimately, and with whom he worked very closely over a certain period of time, i.e. the last six months of the Iskra period, 1902-03 and the 1½ years from mid-1917 to the autumn of 1918. In spite of earlier differences and conflict, Trotsky became an admirer and trusted colleague of the great leader of the Russian Revolution—Lenin. As the book was written from memory there are certain inaccuracies in it pertaining to certain facts and chronological figures, but nonetheless it is indeed a great source material for any biography to be written (or has already been written) on Lenin or Trotsky himself.

Trotsky, who was not only a great revolutionary political leader, but also a great Historian, as his "History of the Russian Revolution" testifies, has uniquely succeeded in portraying the personality of that reticent, silent man, whom the soviet author, M. Koltsov, described as "wholly unknown and incomprehensible to us". Such incomprehensibility will naturally make the memoirs of Lenin's associates all the more valuable. But as Lionel Kochan has rightly said in the introduction to this book: "But such testimony will also express the man who gives it utterance. Trotsky on Lenin is also Trotsky on Trotsky".

The book will be welcome to all those who have any interest in the Russian Revolution of 1917 or in the lives of the two great architects of that Revolution—Lenin and Trotsky.

—B.C.

#### FOCH: AS MILITARY COMMANDER

By James Marshall

(Published by B.T. Batsford, London, 1972) Pp 268 Price £ 4.00

IN writing this very authoritative account of the military career of Marshal Foch, the author has had the advantage of access to a considerable amount of new source material. Perhaps the most important consti-

tuent of this material are the personal papers of General Maxime Weygand, Chief of Staff to Foch.

The author traces Foch's rise in the French military hierarchy with admirable clarity. Foch's most remarkable traits are brought out clearly. For example, the author takes great pains to show that Foch's tact, coupled with his firmness and sympathetic understanding of the other's point of view, was the main factor responsible for the smooth functioning of the Supreme Allied Command.

General Marshall-Cornwall also has a great deal to say on Foch's penchant for constantly being on the offensive in an operation. He says that Foch's offensive concept was based on lessons drawn from the Napoleonic Wars and was not quite relevant to early 20th century warfare. However, he reveals gradually that as each battle developed Foch realised that each offensive had, of necessity, to be a carefully prepared offensive. Else it was doomed to disaster.

This, indeed, is a controversial aspect of Foch. If we consider the horrifying casualty figures of the Marne, Ypres and Somme battles, the question naturally comes to mind whether they were not largely due to Foch's mistaken notion of the offensive concept and its subsequent misapplication in actual battle. Fortunately General Marshall-Cornwall has given us a sufficiently detailed account of Foch's tactical handling of his troops in battle, which should enable the reader to draw his own conclusions.

Considerable information is given on commanders other than Foch. Sir Henry Wilson, Sir Douglas Haig, Marshal Joffre, General John Pershing and many others are spoken of at length especially on aspects of their inter-relationship.

The book itself is a product of long periods of research and is well documented by maps, appendices and footnotes. Though detailed, it does not make heavy reading. It is a simply written, enlightening and critical commentary on one who was perhaps, as the author himself shows, the ablest French military commander of the Great War.

—A T

#### COLLECTING MEDALS AND DECORATIONS

By Alec A. Purves

(Published by B. A. Seaby, London, 1968) Pp 192 Price 35 S.

**T**HE chests of many a serviceman now adorn several medals, thanks to our victory over Pakistan. But there are others who don't shed their blood in the battlefield but gather such treasures sitting in the comforts of their drawing rooms. They are the collectors of medals and decorations. An expensive hobby but, like all hobbies, one that provides sufficient diversion, great pleasure and deep interest to those engaged in it.

This work is a collector's guide. It gives the kind of information usually not found in the other medal books. It omits the descriptive data of orders, decorations and medals as this is easily obtainable elsewhere, but concentrates on how a beginner should venture into this fascinating hobby, what

"tools of the trade" he should possess, how he should buy and sell, house and mount his collection, the way to preserve them, distinguish genuine from the faked ones and so on. The book describes in some detail important features of British Orders of decorations, Medals for gallantry in action, British campaign medals, polar and commemorative Medals, foreign decorations, primarily from the collector's angle. The book has excellent appendices dealing with bibliography, numismatic dealers and societies of medals collectors.

The author is a Fellow of the Royal Numismatic Society and past president and founder member of the Orders and Medals Research Society. With 25 years of experience of serious collecting behind him it makes him eminently suited to write this book.

—R N G

#### ANTIQUE WEAPON: A-Z

by Douglas J. Fryer

(Published by G. Bell, London, 1969) Pp 114 Price 50 S.

**M**R Douglas J. Fryer's book is addressed, not to the specialist working in the museum, but to the ordinary collector of antique weapons. The specimens shown in the book are not rarities but the kind of material any collector might expect to encounter. Mr Fryer speaks with authority since he has been working for long as the sales cataloguer of a well-known firm of specialist auctioneers of arms and armour. All the illustrations given in the book are of items that have passed through his hands, except for thirty pieces in the author's possession and one from a different collection.

There are arms galore, firearms, accessories, swords and daggers and sundry weapons. There are weapons from Europe and weapons from India. There are also weapons from Japan. Each section comprises a glossary containing the names and descriptions of weapons and parts of weapons, illustrated by diagrams where necessary. However, one misses a general introduction which might have described the delights of collecting antique arms, giving information about famous collections.

The section on eastern and native weapons, the latter appellation presumably referring to tribals like Moros of North Borneo or the Australian aboriginals, contains only the more important Indian weapons of the medieval era. It could have been more exhaustive. The definitions are pithy and succinct, and yet reasonably comprehensive. The photographs are beautifully reproduced. A large number of entries are of special interest to Indians: there are such curiosities as a combined axe and matchlock pistol, a four-shot revolving matchlock gun and some flintlock blunderbusses and rifles, besides a fair number of cut-and-thrust weapons of Indian manufacture. The place of honour, in the opinion of the present reviewer, is rightly due to entry No 155, a 6-shot, 5 mm pinfire 'Apache' pepperbox revolver-knuckleduster-dagger of the late nineteenth century. This is one of the four entries aptly described by the author as 'firearms curiosa'.

A good book for the amateur collector of antique weapons, authoritative and well-produced.

—N N D



## CORRESPONDENCE

*Correspondence is invited on subjects which have been dealt with in the Journal or which are of general interest to the services.*

To

The Editor of USI Journal

### THE MILITARY IMPACT OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

Dear Sir,

Please permit me to compliment Lt Col A K Minocha through the pages of our journal, for a very simple yet instructive article on satellite communications, published in October-December 1972 issue of the Journal. I feel that the author has given us a glimpse of military employment of satellites not only for communications but also for battlefield surveillance, navigation and weapon control, in a very understandable language commensurate with the clientele of our journal. This article stands out more because we do not often get articles of general scientific interest in the Journal.

With the passage of time, science and technology are going to make a still deeper impact on warfare techniques. It is, therefore, necessary for the leaders of our Armed Forces abreast of the latest developments in the fields of science and technology. I think the USI Journal can do a lot in this direction by publishing articles of this nature.

C/o 56 APO  
26 Feb 73

Lt Col Yatindra Pratap

## SECRETARY'S NOTES

### SUBSCRIPTIONS

Subscriptions are payable in advance. The financial year of the Institution is from January to December. Intending members can join at any time of the year, when back issues of the Journal for that year will be supplied. There are some members who have yet to pay their subscription for the current year. They are requested to make payment to avoid unnecessary reminders.

### CHANGES OF ADDRESS

Members are requested to notify any changes of address to the Secretary's office promptly, as issues of the Journal posted to members are sometimes returned undelivered by the Post Office with remarks such as 'the addressee has been transferred', etc.

### SUGGESTIONS FOR THE JOURNAL

The USI Journal is in its 102nd year of publication. As you will no doubt appreciate, the Institution spends a great deal of its funds on producing this publication. We would like to have your comments, criticism and suggestions so that we may improve this publication to meet your interests.

### MESS LIBRARIES

Although it is gratifying to know that more and more officers have joined the Institution, it would be helpful if these members in Messes which do not subscribe to the Journal would persuade the President of the Mess Committee to add this Journal to the periodicals, available in the Mess. Thus, our readers' circle would be greatly increased, useful information contained in articles would reach more officers, and the influence which the Journal can exert would be correspondingly increased.

### NEW MEMBERS

From 1st January to 31st March, 1973 the following members joined the Institution :—

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ADVANI, Maj M.D.  
AIYAPPA, Lt Col K.P.  
AKHILESH SHARMA, Capt

AKSHEY KAPILA, Maj  
AMAR SINGH, Maj  
ANAND, Capt V.K.  
APPA RAO, Dr D.N.

ARORA Capt K.K.  
ARUN, 2/Lt  
ASHOK CHAKI, Capt  
ASHOK JOHRI, Capt  
ASHOK KUMAR, Capt  
ASHOK NAGPAL, Capt  
ASHTA PUTRA, Capt J.K.  
AUJLA, Flt Lt S.S.  
AVASTHY, Maj A.K.  
AVASTHY, Capt R.D.  
AVTAR SINGH, Capt  
AVTAR SINGH, Capt  
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BADAL, Capt S.S.  
BADUNI, Sqn Ldr J.P.  
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BAJAJ, Capt H.P.  
BAJWA, Maj G.S.  
BAKSHI, Maj Y.V.  
BAKSHI TEJRAJINDER SINGH, Capt  
BALBIR SINGH, Maj  
BALBIR SINGH, Capt  
BALKRISHNAN SINGH DINA, Maj  
BALURAM, Maj  
BARNs, Flt. Lt B.S.  
BASHAN RAO  
BATRA, Shri J.G.  
BAWA, Flt. Lt. C.I.  
BAWA, Capt N.K.  
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BHANDARI, Maj M.P.S.  
BHATI, Maj D.S.  
BHATIA, Maj B.L.  
BHATIA, Maj B.R.  
BHATIA, Capt K.L.  
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BHINDER, Sqn Ldr S.S.

BIKRAM CHAND, Maj  
BOSE, Flg Offr S.  
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CHAKRAVARTI, Maj P.K.  
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CHANDER AHUJA, Capt  
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DALVINDER SINGH, Maj  
DALJIT SINGH, Maj  
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DEEPAK BATRA, Maj  
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DEVKI NANDAN, Capt  
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DHANOA, Maj P.S.  
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MUKHERJEE, Capt S.P.  
MUNUSWAMY, Capt P.  
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